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Introduction 
We live in a time of great wealth and great opportunities, and where the creativity and 
ingenuity of man has led to competences and technologies that have helped us solve 
or alleviate problems that have been haunting mankind for ages.  This applies to 
everything from the production of new medicines and food, to the philosophical 
principles underpinning the modern democracies. 
During the renaissance Europe let loose a strong belief in mankind’s ability to solve 
its own problems, a belief that still shapes our activities and our way of thinking. 
Modern “Western” Man (which now includes people from all parts of the World), 
believes that given enough freedom and the necessary resources, most – or at least 
many –of the problems facing him can be solved. 
Whether this is literally true or not is beside the point. Our various industrial, 
scientific and political revolutions clearly show that much is possible, and that human 
creativity can be used to achieve overreaching goals of social welfare, social justice, 
cultural development and economic growth. 
Still, many challenges lay ahead. Moreover, the same creativity that brings us 
solutions to social problems also brings us new challenges, as in the areas of ecology, 
diseases and new ways of waging wars, and it is our common responsibility to meet 
these challenges, on the individual, local, national, European and global levels. 
In all modern societies there is a division of labour between the public sector on the 
one hand and the private and “civil” sectors on the other. We will come back to what 
distinguishes these sectors later on in this report. For the time being let us say that 
there are activities in our societies that is directly controlled by the state and other 
public authorities, and that is – in one way of the other – meant to serve the common 
good of the citizens.  
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In the Publin report D14 The structure and size of the public sector in an enlarged 
Europe, Andrés Maroto and Luis Rubalcaba, point out that there are different ways of 
defining and calculating the size of the public sector. The figure shown above 
illustrates two indicators for the relative size of the public sector in 2002 in the EEA 
countries, in Israel, US and Japan:  
• public revenue as a percentage of GDP,  
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• public expenditure as percentage of GDP. 
• In addition the figure describes the overall net public savings as a share of of GDP. 
The data are taken from OECD 2004. In some countries, such as Finland, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, France, Belgium and Austria, the public revenue as percentage of 
GDP exceeds 50 percent. At the other side, countries such as Mediterranean countries 
(Spain, Portugal and Greece), presents levels around 40%-45%, and Ireland around 
35%, close to the levels of other countries such as Japan or the United States.  
Whatever the percentage, one thing is clear: the public sector plays an important role 
in all these countries. It makes use of a significant part of the resources available, and 
it contributes in an important way to the overall wealth creation. This sector’s ability 
to develop relevant competences and innovate in order to deliver better as well as new 
services is therefore of an outmost importance. 
This report includes reflections mainly based on the general “horizontal” work done 
within the Publin project, i.e. on the general discussion taking place within the Publin 
consortium and on the following reports1:  
D9 On the differences between public and private sector innovation 
By Thomas Halvorsen, Johan Hauknes, Ian Miles and Rannveig Røste 
D14 The structure and size of the public sector in an enlarged Europe 
By Andrés Maroto and Luis Rubalcaba  
D15 Policy learning, what does it mean and how can we study it? 
By René Kemp and Rifka Weehuizen  
D16 Studies of innovation in the public sector, a theoretical framework 
By Rannveig Røste  
D17 Report on the Publin surveys 
By Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Aviv Shoham, Ayalla Ruvio, Nitza Schwabsky 
We have, however, also included some of the general conclusions from the two case 
study summary reports: 
D18 Innovation in the social sector – case study analysis 
By Ludmila Malikova and Katarina Staroòová  
D19 Innovation in the health sector – case study analysis 
By Paul Cunningham  
The purpose of this report is to give an overall synthesis of the work in the Publin 
project concerning the question of the characteristics of innovation, of the innovation 
activities and their impacts, in public sectors and activities in our economies.  The 
overall summary report from Publin will be reported to the European Commission and 
Member States in December 2005. A key part of the final report is to draw 
 
1 All reports are available for download at the PUBLIN site, www.step.no/publin
 3
implications of this work for the formulation of policies and strategies to improve the 
operation and management of public activities and sectors. These implications will 
form the basis for the identification of more operational policy recommendations, 
both at the level of the European Union and at the level of Member States. 
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Innovation in the public sector 
A range of studies of the development of new products, new production processes and 
new behaviors in private, market-based companies have contributed with important 
understanding of some of the main processes underlying social and economic change 
in modern economies.2 However, in no way does this understanding provide 
explanations of the wider processes of change in our societies and economies. Even 
when it comes to economic structures the answers it provides, are only partial.  
One evident aspect of modern societies that is conspicuously missing in much of this 
analysis is what in a wide term generally is denoted the “public sector”. Generally 
activities by public organizations and institutions are seen as either regulatory 
frameworks for innovation activities or as more or less passive providers of inputs to 
private sector innovation, or as recipients and users of – or a “market” for – 
innovative products generated by a “private sector” – of market based agents.  
Clearly the role of the “public sector” activities in our societies is more important than 
this – more important for socio-economic development and for the achievement of the 
ultimate welfare objectives that underpin the goals of public activities and policies. It 
is therefore something of a paradox that the socio-economic innovation literature has 
almost completely neglected what is a major aspect of all European economies: the 
public sector activities.3 Becoming aware of this neglect was an important factor in 
motivating the Publin study. Further dialogue and clarification suggested to us that 
Publin’s key role should be to generate a framework for the inclusion of this vital 
element in the trans-disciplinary analysis of socio-political and –economic change in 
our societies. 
Our main starting point is simply stated: In a market based framework innovation by 
agents/organizations is basically the reflection of the agents’ adaptation to and 
attempts to mould the structure of the incentives and expected rewards they perceive 
as facing them. The simplified way of expressing this starting point to market-based 
innovation is that companies as suppliers of economic goods generally are profit-
seeking agents, and  more specifically – in their attempt to reap as large profits as 
possible – profit-maximizers. Innovation strategies by companies is thus deliberately 
chosen and shaped by the search for maximal profits, conditioned by the information 
and insight the decision maker has about that part of the socio-economic universe in 
which the company is operating. We will stick to this oversimplified model for the 
time being. 
A central characteristic of what we generally conceive of as “public activities” is that 
the apparently simple structures of drivers for private sector innovation are not 
applicable. To put it bluntly, public sector innovation is too complex to fit a simple 
model like this. To some extent this is only apparent, but to understand why this is so, 
we need to be more explicit on what we mean by the concept of ‘innovation’. To 
approach the innovation concept and attempt the translation of the concept to a public 
 
2 See the Publin Report No. D8 Studies of innovation in the public sector, a literature review 
By Rannveig Røste for a presentation of research on innovation in the private sector . See the literature 
list in this report for references. 
3 This does not mean that there has not been done research in innovation in the public sector. See 
Report D16 for an overview. 
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or other non-market context, makes it necessary to go back to the core analytical 
definition of innovation. 
From this we will attempt to generate a framework for analysis of activity changes 
and their motivations in contexts where public control, provision or ownership is a 
key characteristic. In short; we will attempt to generate an understanding of 
innovation in public organizations and institutions. Though these are essentially non-
profit, even public organizations can in a basic sense be seen as reward-seeking. 
We emphasise here that our approach is based on a key conviction – the conviction 
that the direct application of any notions of “private sector” technological or non-
technological, product or process innovation to “public sectors” does not address the 
key characteristics of any non-private, non-market activities. Although the use of 
technologies, services, knowledge and services developed in the private sector is an 
essential part of public sector innovation, the public sector is not a passive user of and 
adaptor to such innovation. From a social as well as a technological point of view, 
public innovation processes should be seen as genuine innovation processes in their 
own right.  
As well as not being primarily about the use of technical artefacts imported from the 
private sector, the Publin project is not primarily about the implementation of a range 
of business management methods in public organizations. Rather, these constitute 
some of the many the informational inputs to innovation in public activities and 
organizations. As such they partake in the structured environment around the public 
activity/organization in question. We might rephrase this as saying that these and 
other informational input mechanisms generate a structured ‘innovation system’ of the 
activity or organization in question. 
The key analytical questions are not about the automatic implementation and direct 
translation by the agent into behaviour of such information. The required focus here 
should be on the decisions to utilize specific parts of the wider information set built 
on these and other informational inputs, how the relevant information parts are – so to 
say – pieced together and the rationales and impact of the innovations – i.e. the 
implementation of behavioural change – both at the level of the activities and 
organizations, and at the aggregate system- or macro-level. As such the perception by 
the organization of its structured innovation environment is important. 
Publin’s objective is thus ultimately to provide a basis for a genuinely trans-
disciplinary micro-theory of innovation in activities and organizations operating 
within a framework of public governance and analytical principles for understanding 
the macro-implications of this micro-level foundation. As such the long term goal of 
the agenda Publin launches is a ‘bottoms-up’ theory which we are convinced will 
provide a vital complement to more traditional ‘top-down’ theories of public 
activities. 
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From the PUBLIN report D19 Paul Cunningham:  Innovation in the Public Health sector: A 
case study analysis 
Green, Howells and Miles (2001), in their investigation of service innovation in the 
European Union, provide a suitable definition of the term innovation which denotes a 
process where organizations are  
“doing something new i.e. introducing a new practice or process, 
creating a new product (good or service), or adopting a new pattern of 
intra- or inter-organizational relationships (including the delivery of 
goods and services)”.   
What is clear from Green, Howells and Miles’ definition of innovation is that the
emphasis is on novelty. As they go on to say,  
“innovation is not merely synonymous with change. Ongoing change is 
a feature of most… organizations. For example the recruitment of new 
workers constitutes change but is an innovative step only where such 
workers are introduced in order to import new knowledge or carry out 
novel tasks”. 
Change then, is endemic; organizations grow or decline in size, the communities 
served, the incumbents of specific positions, and so on. Innovation is also a common 
phenomenon, and is even more prominent as we enter the “knowledge-based 
economy”.  efining innovation 
ur mental model of thinking about innovation has a strong legacy – not just from 
arket-based activities in general, but more specifically from manufacturing 
ctivities. The ways we reflect over the innovation concept in both everyday and 
nalytical usage tend to carry with them a reification – or even materialisation – of 
nnovation. This may be applicable in a commodity4 production context, but becomes 
ncreasingly problematic when the information required to convey a description of 
what is produced and how it is done” gets more complex in an informational sense 
nd hence more costly to access5. 
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  A commodity is essentially an economic good which is information-poor; the information set needed 
o describe its transaction and utility (its ‘economic’) characteristics is small, and hence transferable at 
very) low cost.  
 It is important to emphasize that this is not a question of material, technical or related complexity, but 
omplexity of the information required to convey sufficient information about the transfer and use 
haracteristics of the ‘product’ supplied. The structure – or complexity – of this information set 
ncludes both the direct information on  the ‘product’ and the information needed to make sense of this 
nformation set for the user side. The investments needed to access this information, thus also 
ncompasses the necessary investments to establish the required translation capability. 
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Innovation in the public sector may indeed include the production of material “things” 
or products, but more often that not public innovation entails the application of 
already existing “things” or the delivery of services, accompanied by organizational 
change and policy development. 
The problem of defining innovation in a general, context-free way is evident in the 
attempts to understand innovation in service activities (see e.g. Hauknes 1998). It is a 
further aggravating problem that the instruments of innovation measurements may be 
taken as support for such a “reified material business practice” approach to innovation 
(for a service based criticism of these instruments, see Hauknes 2003). 
There is an ambiguity in the use of the innovation concept in the innovation research 
literatures. Innovation is used in these literatures to describe  
− the first use of some type or category of behaviour (e.g. a new product),  
− the development and implementation process of a new product, new organization 
or 
− the codified information set describing the functional content of the innovation in 
more or less generic terms (i.e. independent of its context of application and 
development). 
The common misapprehension that meaningful and valuable innovation is 
“technological” does not alleviate this problem. There are very strong indications that 
the understanding of the concept of “technology”’ varies substantially between 
cultural and language contexts, a crucial point when measurements of innovation are 
at the core based on subjective assessments by responding participators in the activity. 
But this then immediately also transfers to a difficulty when “non-technological” 
innovation is introduced. 
To answer the core question – what is innovation? – in the context of public and non-
market activities, we have to go back to the fundamental question.  
Firstly: Innovation is at core the premeditated implementation of purposeful or 
intentional behavioural change by social agents within the activity context under 
consideration. The agents as “units of analysis” may be individuals or multi-
individual organizations, pending the specific activity context and analytical questions 
addressed.  
Secondly: The concept of innovation is to function as an analytical concept and tool. 
It should not be understood as a descriptor of an objective reality or generic category 
of behavioural dimensions in an empirical reality. It is a tool for analysis of social 
activities and interaction and, thence, is equally a function of the type of analysis and 
the questions raised in this. Ultimately we as analysts have to decide what is to be or 
not be counted as (an) innovation. It follows that a critical stance is needed towards  
• normative assessments of innovation in general or of types of innovations (i.e. that 
innovations are normatively positive – or negative – in themselves, and thus ‘the 
more, the better’,  
• of generalisation of conceptions of innovation rooted in one particular set of social 
contexts (e.g. “markets for manufactured goods”, “high-tech products”, etc.),  
• of the direct application of “obvious” generic typologies of innovation – as 
“product” and “process” innovations – and, lastly,  
• of the reification of innovation independently of the specification of an analytical 
context. 
 
Types of innovation in the public sector 
Innovation in the public sector can be divided into several types, like for instance: 
• a new or improved service  
(for example health care at home) 
• process innovation  
(a change in the manufacturing of a service or product) 
• administrative innovation  
(for example the use of a new policy instrument, which may be a result 
of policy change) 
• system innovation  
(a new system or a fundamental change of an existing system, for 
instance by the establishment of new organizations or new patterns of co-
operation and interaction) 
• conceptual innovation  
(a change in the outlook of actors; such changes are accompanied by the 
use of new concepts, for example integrated water management or 
mobility leasing) 
• radical change of rationality 
(meaning that the world view or the mental matrix of the employees of 
an organization is shifting) 
The first two types of innovation can be subsumed under product innovation.  
The innovations can be labelled in the following ways: 
• Incremental innovations—radical innovations  
(denoting the degree of novelty, in industry most innovations can be 
considered incremental improvements of already existing products, 
processes or services) 
• Top-down innovations—bottom-up innovations  
(denoting who has initiated the process leading to behavioral changes, 
“the top” – meaning management or organizations or institutions higher 
up in the hierarchy – or “the bottom” – meaning “workers on the factory 
floor”, in this case public employees, civil servants and mid-level policy 
makers) 
• Needs-led innovations and efficiency-led innovation 
(denoting whether the innovation process has been initiated to solve a 
specific problem or in order to make already existing products, services 
or procedures more efficient) 
Taken from PUBLIN report D9 On the differences between public and private sector 
innovation, by Thomas Halvorsen, Johan Hauknes, Ian Miles and Rannveig Røste 
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To start with the basics, we suggest the following general definition of innovation: 
Innovation is a social entity’s implementation and performance of a new specific form 
or repertoire of social action that is implemented deliberately by the entity in the 
context of the objectives and functionalities of the entity’s activities.  
With this innovation is a behavioural expression of the agent’s intentions and 
objectives, shaped within the context of his/her/its local theory6 of the socio-cultural 
and socio-economic environment. Its rationale and wider ‘meaning’ resides at the 
fundamental level only in the subjective life world of the social agent.  
To put it bluntly: Innovation is doing something differently and deliberately in order 
to achieve certain objectives. And rationale for doing so is shaped by the environment 
of the individual. 
The only way innovation can gain inter-subjective status is through the transmission 
of information about the new repertoire or about its direct or indirect impacts on the 
externally observable characteristics of the agent. In other words: In order for an 
innovation to succeed, more people must understand and accept it, and in order for 
that to happen, learning must take place. Hence information generation, transmission 
and reception necessarily have to play a key role in any theories of ‘innovation 
diffusion’ and impacts. 
We have introduced a criterion of novelty in this definition to reflect the core 
definition’s focus on ‘behavioural change’. Innovation is seen as a process of change 
in the repertoire of the entity’s actions. Clearly the relevant type of novelty here is 
new (1) at the time of implementation (2) for the entity.  
In other word: Innovation is a change of behaviour that is new to the relevant agent, 
but not necessarily new to society as a whole. If a civil servant deliberately introduces 
a new way of doing his or her professional obligations or activities, with the purpose 
of providing an improved service, this is an innovation, even if someone else might 
have done something similar elsewhere.  
Change and novelty still leaves ample room for further specifications and limitations, 
a question we will return to shortly.  
Four implications follow of this approach to innovation: 
− Innovation is always activity specific, specific to the agent, its activities and the 
relevant institutional environment of these. 
− The relevant design and decision making context is always subjective, reflecting the 
relevant decision maker’s operationally oriented perception of the characteristics of 
the activity, available resources, and the relative expected benefits of the potential 
innovation and its alternatives. 
                                                 
6 The cognitive concept of ‘local theories’ used here, has been given many names f.i. in the social 
psychological, organization theory and management literatures, as mental models, schemata, frames of 
reference etc. For a discussion of these see Walsh, Organization Science, vol 6 (1995), 280-321 
 10
                                                
− The process of designing new operational modes of behaviour and choice on their 
implementation imply a degree of autonomy7 within the domain of control in the 
relevant decision making process. In order to innovate, the agent must have leeway 
to do so. 
− The subjectively determined, altered mode of behaviour is implemented over an 
institutional and functional domain, corresponding to a domain of control over 
which the relevant behaviours may be instructed. The border of this domain is 
closely related to the distinction between the innovating agent and its institutional 
and functional environment with which it interacts. In other words: there are limits 
to the area of the public sector an innovator controls, 
To emphasise; innovation is location specific in socio-economic time and space and 
activity specific. Furthermore, it is subjectively determined, shaped by the resources 
and perceptions of the individual agent, and thus agent specific. Hence it follows that 
an innovation – a behavioural transition by a specific agent - is strictly a micro-level 
phenomenon.  
An innovation generates information of two kinds:  
1 First of all the innovation implementation – the decision making – creates the 
information set “agent A has now started doing B” where B itself is an 
information set describing aspects of the behavioural procedure. This information 
set may be captured by other agents8 in the environment of agent A more or less 
completely and will be integrated into their overall activity oriented information 
set. This is the innovation diffusion process. People learn from other people’s way 
of doing things 
2 Secondly the innovation generates experiential data concerning  
• its implementation and  
• its effects on the operations of the agent and its environment.  
For the innovating agent the correspondence between this information and its ex 
ante expectations concerning the impact on its operations and position vis-à-vis  
its environment, provide information on further needs or opportunities of 
innovation – for further changes in the active repertoire of behaviours. I.e. the 
agent is learning from experience.  
For organizations in the environment of the innovator, this information may – but 
need not – provide inputs to their own further behavioural decisions. I.e. it may 
alter the criteria for their perceptions and decisions concerning what are effective 
future behaviours. In short: they are learning and gaining experience based on 
their familiarity with this particular innovation. 
 
7  We implicitly assume that the agent has a feasible choice between at least two options; to continue 
the old ‘way of doing [a] thing’ or implement new ways of doing the same thing. The location of 
responsibilities for management clearly indicates some degree of autonomy at the level and over the 
domain it ‘manages’. 
8 It far from necessary to assume here that these other agents are ‘competitors’ to A.  
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The latter point of inter-agent diffusion of information implementation and impact 
suggests some key characteristics of the associated generalized diffusion processes of 
information on innovation. To be diffused among agents, this information set, i.e. 
what is learned,  
− must in some sense be “visible”,  
− it must be sufficiently complete or rich in its content to be decipherable by the 
receiver, to be translated and interpreted into the receiver’s cognitive and activity-
related information context, and lastly,  
− it must be of sufficiently noteworthy content for these other agents to take notice of 
it.  
That is, for a diffusion process to arise: The specific information set must have a 
sufficient “signal-to-noise” ratio, and it must be coded in a way the receiver can 
interpret. Furthermore, the interpreted content must be sufficient to trigger the 
recipient; it must alter the criteria for the receiver’s behavioural decisions.  
This clearly involves much more than an epidemiological diffusion of a specific 
“innovation” in the reified sense (i.e. the adaptation of a technology or product), or 
even of evolving categories of innovation “types” as they are described in e.g. product 
cycle descriptions. What we describe here is a generalized diffusion process – but 
where we make explicit a fundamental point, what is diffused is not reified 
innovations, but an information set. This information set bears no direct relation to 
any specific repertoires or activities to provide a relevant response to the information 
set generating innovation; the information set requires translation and interpretation 
before it can provide guidelines for choice of behaviour by the recipient. 9  
This approach to innovation diffusion takes explicitly into account the aspects that 
lead to the description of innovation as “interactive” and “systemic”. Innovation is 
“systemic” – structured and contextual – exactly because the behavioural decisions of 
one agent, imparts a change in the expected costs or rewards on variant choices of 
behaviour for organizations in its environment. Or, from the perspective of the 
prospective innovator; an innovation implemented by one organization in the 
environment, may generate altered expected benefits for alternate behaviours – it may 
alter the subjectively perceived (innovation) incentive structure of the prospective 
innovator. The world has in a sense become a different place due to the introduction 
of this innovation, which also have consequences for how people behave elsewhere in 
this part of the system. An obvious conclusion from this is that such sequential 
innovation diffusion processes will exhibit a strong form of historicity, or path-
dependence.  
 
9 Moreover, nowhere should we limit this to single- or few-valued relations between the interpreted 
information and prescriptions – or blue prints – for behavior on the side of the original innovator. 
External observation of an organization and its activities does not generally allow complete observation 
of what is done or how it is done at a functional level. What can be observed are facets, or implications, 
of these behaviors and their impact on various external measures of performance for the organisation. 
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These generalized diffusion processes involve processes clearly reminiscent of 
information percolation and other permeation processes. Our outline emphasizes a 
reactive correlation of behaviours between agents far beyond restricted imitation-
based contagion diffusion, in that our approach reflects the cognitive interpretation, 
reformulation and assessment of the information set by the agents in this diffusion 
process. Hence, they should perhaps better be described as reaction processes or 
chains, rather than as diffusion.  
Hence civil servants are not passive containers taking up new technologies or new 
inventions. They are themselves changed through the innovation process. 
From this it is evident that innovation has a close relation to generation of social time 
– it may even be described, as the Austrian economist Ludwig Lachmann does – as 
generating “socio-economic” time (Lachmann 1968). This view has strong 
connotations to the Shannon type of information theories; information is to these 
systems what entropy is to thermodynamical systems. We will not enter into these 
fascinating and important topics here, but just note that this is what is behind the 
ubiquitous claim that innovation is intimately linked to “learning” – and Bengt-Åke 
Lundvall’s suggestion that the present stage of our societies development may be 
denoted a “learning society” or economy. But in this sense our societies have always 
been “learning” societies; hence it cannot function as an analytical concept to 
distinguish our present era from previous ones. 
The “learning” associated with this is learning of a very general and diffuse sense – it 
includes every aspect of the processes that underpins agents’ implementation of new 
behaviours – that generates innovation. This suggests that “learning” is not a 
fundamental concept in this discussion. Rather, it is used at this level as a derivative 
of the innovation concept, ultimately defined as all cognitive activities underlying 
innovations. So, by defining innovation, we also define the derived “learning” concept 
used in the innovation literatures. 
This is intimately linked to a key aspect of the implementation of behavioural change 
– of innovation. Innovation is as we saw above, subjectively determined, and based on 
expectations of future rewards. These expectations may be confirmed or disproved – 
whether one or the other is outside the control of the innovating agent.  
Disappointment or confirmation will only be revealed to the innovator some time after 
the innovation has been expressed or implemented. In fact, in this inter-temporal gap 
between expectations and revealed consequences lies a key spur or incentive to 
further innovation. But more than this, innovation has to be seen within a context of 
(genuine) uncertainty10. Hence, innovation activities must be seen as exploratory and 
conditional. Ex post innovations are seen to succeed or fail, but their success or failure 
is not necessarily an expression of the success or failure of the innovator at the time of 
innovation. 
 
10 It is usual in this context to refer to Frank Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty, see 
Knight (1932). Risks are what agents can form objective probability based expectations on future 
‘states’ about – it is solely a question of getting access to complete information – while uncertainties 
are factors on which it is impossible to have complete expectations – factors that are totally 
‘unpredictable’. 
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This is not just a simple question of stochastic variables and factors in the equation – 
or of new knowledge opening previously unforeseen opportunities. What is generally 
the case – whether in private or public sectors – is that improved rewards for one 
agent imply reduced benefits for another agent. This generalized competitive 
framework is the essence – both of market competition, and of most public sector 
activities. Most of our public activities are placed in a competitive framework, though 
not necessarily a framework as simple as market competition. Whatever its form the 
competition acts as a spur to innovation. But here the ultimate benefits accrued to the 
innovator depends on what the competitor – who is generally also an innovator – 
does. If the first innovator lacks information on the decisions on future behaviour 
made by the competitor, her best expectations may generally be that the present 
behaviour is continued. In this, she will often be proven wrong. 
It is easy to design simple models to emphasize this point. Within a public sector we 
could consider e.g. the competition for (public) funding in a system based on Sir 
Humphrey’s law11, a powerful outline of the incentive system facing public agencies 
and organizations. Sir Humphrey’s law would have a profound impact on the 
innovation strategies of the competing agencies or departments. In such a model 
education would compete with health services, the police force with kindergartens, 
and defence with sanitary services. 
There is always a dimension of competition – and always incentives to innovate. 
Innovations should neither be seen as normatively good in itself – innovations are 
basically normatively neutral in a social context – nor as activities that have some 
obligation to serve the ‘public good’. Micro-level innovation is simply a reflection of 
the incentive system imposed – partly deliberately, but to a large extent probably un-
intentional – on the activities in question. 
Ultimately we are left with “innovation” as the key concept. Now evidently, the 
definition we gave above is very wide12. But at this general level, this is as far as we 
can go. To limit the set of “innovations” further, we need to bring in a different type 
of perspectives. The obvious category of perspectives to bring in with our context is 
the set of analytical questions we address. So by defining our analytical position and 
the issues we address, we have to work backwards into the set of innovations. The 
(narrower) definition of innovation this generates is thus only relevant within the 
frame set by our choice of issues and questions. If we change the content and 
orientation of our analysis, we need also consider the need of changing this 
delimitation of the (broader) set of innovations defined generally. 
 
11 Sir Humphrey’s law is stated as follows in the BBC series “Yes, Minister”: “[T]o measure success in 
[…]the Civil Service […], we measure success by the size of our staff and our budget.  By definition a 
big department is more successful than a small one … [T]his simple proposition is the basis of our 
whole system”. However, with emphasizing solely stocks and neglecting its changes, Sir Humphrey 
misses on important criterion, namely growth. The core essence of this system lies in the combined 
effect of size and growth rate. 
 
12 The definition at this level does not distinguish any forms of behavioral change, neither in terms of 
their content or activity orientation, or in terms of information ‘height’ or visibility. 
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Defining public sector 
Besides “innovation”, the other key concept in the Publin project and its issues is 
“public sectors,” including their organizations and activities. Again we are facing a 
situation where we may choose different paths to delimit the key concept. 
It is not easy to make a perfect definition of what the public sector entails, especially 
in a time where there is no one-to-one relationship between the area of public 
responsibility and the organisations providing public services. For instance: health 
and social services is a public responsibility in all European countries. However, in 
some countries the required services are provided by public institutions. In others 
private companies and third sector organisations like the church are involved in 
providing publicly funded services as well.  
We could choose to start from characteristics of the products generated. The concept 
of “public goods” would provide such a starting point. Public goods are socio-
economic goods that are non-excludable and non-rival13.  
An approach here would focus on the production or management of public goods. 
Goods may be public – or private – due to its natural characteristics, or by 
institutional arrangement. Now clearly, what we generally understand as “public 
sectors” do not accord completely by this.  
The generation of several public goods is outside the public sectors, and public sectors 
very often generate non-public – i.e. private – goods, sometimes on the basis of an 
institutionally set monopoly, sometimes in competition with private organizations. 
More importantly, the various types of goods fall between these two extreme, perfect 
categories. A well-known example is the treatment of knowledge and information; 
often being described as a “quasi-public good”.  
Knowledge and information may be excludable both by institutional arrangements – 
as the setting up of property rights systems or oath of secrecy arrangements – and due 
to its internal characteristics – as with the need of required extensive expertise to read, 
or understand, the information. This suggests, furthermore that the quasi-public 
characteristics of information, may change over time. 
Similarly could start from a control or ownership perspective. Ownership and control 
may be defined widely through collective or communal ownership – which would 
encompass both the so-called ‘third sector’ and institutional constructions such as 
foundations etc. where the expression of ownership is prohibited by a legal 
framework. Alternatively, a more narrow starting point would be focusing functions 
and activities organized within institutions under explicit public ownership and 
control, either through natural and/or legal monopolies or through the activities’ status 
as legal or traditionally status as public provided services. 
 
13 Excludability refers to the opportunity to express property rights over the good, with a perfectly 
excludable good an owner can exclude other users costlessly from getting access to the good. Rivalry 
expresses broadly speaking that the good can only be used one at a time, when used or consumed by 
one party it cannot be consumed by another. The implication of this is that it is impossible to set up a 
market for public goods. 
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A related starting point may be provided by the characteristics of funding of the 
activities and the provision of the services in question. If the main funding of current 
expenses is through the ‘public purse’ – by state or local authorities – without these 
authorities being the direct user or consumer of these services, they would be included 
within the category of the ‘public sector’. 
This suggests a further approach, focusing the nature of the social surplus or benefits 
generated, and the beneficiaries of the activities; who appropriates what benefits of 
the activities. To what extent are the benefits individually or collectively 
appropriable? 
The characteristics and conditions of competition in which the activities are produced 
or generated is an alternative avenue. An immediate distinction here would be 
between provision within a market framework with its specific forms of price 
competition, and non-market provision, whether competitive or non-competitive. 
A generalization of several of these points would be to base a delineation of public 
governance, which would need to consider characteristics of ownership and control, 
of funding, of beneficiaries, and of other stakeholders. 
Though interesting, we chose not to follow this rather resource-intensive line of 
argument of defining the foundation of the Publin project. Rather, in Publin we chose 
a pragmatic approach to defining the public sector. The ultimate objective of Publin is 
to provide an improved basis for European innovation policies by extending the 
present knowledge bases for these – to encompass an understanding of innovation in 
the context of activities and functionalities that are generally or often institutionalized 
in our countries with a strong public participation and where the provision to the 
public, where relevant, is not generally based on market-based mediation. 
The importance of innovation policies to target also public and other non-market 
provided services is evident. This point should need no arguments beyond pointing to 
the fact that an innovation policy that misses out such services, their generation and 
provision, miss crucial elements of the welfare agenda that provides the core rationale 
for innovation policies. The well-known processes of blurring the line between public 
and private institutions, market and non-market provision institutions etc. do not 
change this. Nor does it change the need for policies aimed at generating improved 
quality, efficiency and enhanced adaptation to social welfare needs in the performance 
of publicly controlled services – an innovation policy adapted to the characteristics of 
public services, public activities and organizations. This focus on the micro-level 
processes and activities we call innovation, requires then that these policies are based 
on a solid understanding of the incentive structures facing the organizations and 
individuals, and their mental models of them. In short, it needs to be based on a 
contextual understanding of the inhibitors and enhancers of innovation in the sense we 
defined it above – and of the relevant processes of information diffusion. 
Hence the main focus for this study is innovation processes of direct relevance to the 
performance of public services, where public institutions are involved in the actual 
innovation process. To adapt to this, we have as a point of departure chosen what has 
been characterized as a functional definition of public activities and sectors, see the 
text box below. In this we have approached the concept of public sectors as being 
comprised of the services and activities that are commonly organized as public – 
whether state or region – owned institutions in our countries. Public administration 
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and management, social security, the legislative and regulatory framework, education, 
health care, and wider social services are activities that generally are seen as ‘public’ 
– and parts of the obligations and key operations of a public sector. In this, defence, 
education and health and social services are activities where (almost) the complete 
“production system” within the European welfare model resides within the public 
sphere. 
This definition by necessity introduces an ambiguity in the institutional 
characteristics. Both privately owned ‘for profit’ companies and non-governmental 
‘private non-profit’ institutions may deliver services paid for and controlled by public 
authorities. To what extent private companies and NGOs are involved in this kind of 
activity vary both between sectors and countries.  
If one wants to compare public innovation in various sectors and countries variations 
in the institutional set-up must be taken into consideration. If one country decides to 
provide care for the elderly through publicly owned organizations, another through 
private and yet another through a mix of both types, these should all be included when 
saying something useful about innovation in the public sector – when a functional 
perspective is chosen. The only institutions that would fall outside this definition are 
private homes for the elderly that do not receive public funding. 
There is another reason for including non-public companies and institutions providing 
publicly funded services, and that is their role as nodes in the diffusion network of 
innovations. Private companies and non-governmental organizations may implement 
innovations that are later adapted by publicly owned services (and visa versa), or they 
may be key nodes in the generation of signals on certain forms of innovation to the 
wider community of actors within the relevant sphere of activity. As their governance 
framework differs, they may have variant incentives to express such signals in a 
situation with variant ownership and control systems operating in parallel. 
The interaction between private companies and public institutions go beyond 
outsourcing – or other immediate forms of externalization. Innovation in the public 
sector may be the result of a public institution buying and implementing technology, 
machinery or competences developed by and for private companies. In many cases 
this innovation is the end product of an innovation process where private and public 
institutions interact and cooperate. This applies, for instance, to public hospitals 
procuring medical instruments and equipment or medical instruments from private 
suppliers, or the acquisition by the national Air Force of new platform for fighter 
planes. Given that many of these products and services are commissioned and defined 
by public sector institutions, and more generally that neither of these sectors exist by 
themselves it will be difficult to draw a definite border between market-based 
“private” innovation on the one hand and innovation in what we understand as public 
organizations and sectors14.  
 
14 This reflects the old debate on the sources and drivers of radical technological innovations and the 
importance of public – mostly governmental - procurement in these. It is a fact that in many of the key, 
radical technological innovations in the 20th century, public sectors played a central role in enabling 
these. 
  
The differences between public and private innovation 
In the Publin report D9 On the differences between public and private sector 
innovation Ian Miles and Rannveig Røste argues that there are great differences 
between the public and private sectors as regards innovation.  They point out that 
public organizations are typically the primary supplier of services and are not 
competing in order to maximize profits15.  This lack of product competition is widely 
held to mean a lack of incentives to improvement.   
However, as Miles and Røste point out, the notion that the connection between a 
firm’s behaviour and pecuniary reward is the central dynamic of economic rationale 
and the development of innovation has to be seen as too simplistic. Frost and Egri 
(1991) consider that there is a “rational myth of innovation” that portrays 
organizations as goal-directed. Although they do not address public-sector innovation 
as such, they do question the role of profitability as criterion for the development of 
innovations.  There is often competition for resources among different individuals and 
projects within a firm, and the strategies that secure victory here are multifaceted – for 
instance, being able to affect who assesses costs and benefits, and how this is done, is 
rather important.  
Defining the public sector 
“The term ‘public sector’ is often used indiscriminately. Three definitions can be found 
(Khury and Van der Torre, 2002; Kuhry, 2003): 
Legal definition: the public sector includes government organizations and organizations 
governed by public law 
Financial definition: besides the above organizations, the public sector includes private 
organizations largely funded by public means, including non-profit organizations 
providing education and health care 
Functional definition: in this case the pubic sector includes all organizations in the field 
of the public administration, social security, law and order, education, health care, and 
social and cultural services, irrespective of their funding source and the legal form of the 
supplier. The functionally defined public sector is sometimes termed the ‘quaternary 
sector’ in policy debates in some European countries, such as Netherlands or Belgium. 
In this report, the functional definition is applied. Instead of the awkward term 
‘quaternary sector’ the term ‘public service sector’ will be used in this context.” 
From PUBLIN report D-20: Andrés Maroto and Luis Rubalcaba: The structure and size of the 
public sector in an enlarged Europe. 
 
                                                 
15 Though not profit-maximizing, it is interesting to note that a competition as outlined above of public 
agencies facing Sir Humphrey’s law would bear key resemblances to William Baumol’s theory of 
revenue-maximizing agents and the structure of the competition between them. 
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We would counter to this, however, that it is really not a question of organizations 
being ‘goal-directed’ – or reward-maximizers, to use a somewhat more neutral term 
than profit-maximizers. Though responding – reactively and proactively – to 
incentives, we should never see incentives structures as complete and beyond any 
difference of opinions in how they are understood and interpreted. Furthermore, 
global incentives are supplemented both by local and intra-organizational incentives, 
where the latter are crucial parts of the incentives facing the individuals comprising 
the organization. Within any organization there is a political struggle16. It will still be 
rationality, but we will open the box of what we include as accepted rationalities. 
One important outcome of the Publin project is that we have learned more about 
innovation related human behaviour in general, and that this knowledge may also be 
used to get a better understanding of incentives for innovation also in the private 
sector.  
It is more than likely that private company employees find their motivation from a 
large number of reasons, the urge for profit being only one of many. As in the public 
sector, private sector workers may be motivated by idealism, the joy of creating 
something new, an intense interest in the topic at hand, friendship and a sense of 
belonging, career ambitions, etc. In the Publin case studies we have found that 
idealism and the urge to develop a better society is an important driving force for 
public innovation.  
Now, this generates a key question – whether these individual sensibilities are more 
likely to survive to organizational and more aggregate levels in public than in private 
activities. If so, what are the implications for overall social welfare considerations in a 
dynamic perspective where we accept that the long term future needs and demands for 
public services are as unknown as the future demand for market goods? 
We have not followed up private sector innovation within Publin. After all, Publin is a 
study of public sector activities. Nevertheless, this general approach to human 
behaviour should be kept in mind when discussing innovation in any sector. 
Possible motivations in the public and private sectors compared, adapted from  Publin report 
D9 On the differences between public and private sector innovation, by Thomas Halvorsen, 
Johan Hauknes, Ian Miles and Rannveig Røste 
Motivations for innovation in the 
public sector /Individuals 
o Prestige 
o Self-fulfilment 
o Professional recognition 
o Potential for spin-off business 
o Idealism 
o Career 
o Power 
o Money (salary) 
Motivations for innovation in the 
private sector /Individuals 
o Prestige 
o Self-fulfilment 
o Idealism 
o Career 
o Power 
o Money (salary, profits, bonuses) 
o Job security via enhanced company 
competitiveness and profitability 
o Imposed requirement 
                                                 
16 It goes without saying that in any the study of any organization we can never neglect the possibility 
of ‘freak beavior’. 
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Motivations for innovation in the 
public sector /Organizations 
o Problem solving (in order to reach 
objectives) 
o Increased funding 
o The propagation of a policy, idea or 
rationality 
o More staff 
o Public relations 
Motivations for innovation in the 
public sector /Organizations 
o Problem solving (in order to reach 
objectives) 
o Profits 
o Market-shares 
o Pre-empt competition 
o Growth (in size) 
o Public relations 
We can easily identify some major differences between public and private sector 
institutions with relevance for analyses of innovation activities. These differences also 
have some immediate implications for the incentive structures for innovative 
activities.  
One factor is the unit of analysis. Apart from publicly owned companies, most public 
institutions are part of a larger chain of command and control where it is harder to 
draw a line between the different parts of the system – and where legal frameworks 
provide little help in this. For instance: public agencies – like research councils or 
directorates of health – interact closely with ministries as well as subordinate 
institutions and “users”. The innovation activities in these institutions are heavily 
influenced by decisions made above and below in the chain of command. The closest 
parallel in the private sector will be large conglomerates or multinational companies. 
Another important difference is that the political aspect is much more important in the 
public than in the private sector. Policy decisions normally affect companies 
indirectly, through laws, regulations and financial support. The public sector is at least 
formally controlled by elected politicians. The intimate link between this governance 
dimension and funding of current expenses of the activities implies a very strong link 
between ownership and control on the one hand and the growth strategies of the 
subsidiary organizations. 
Just as important are the differences in management incentives. Public managers are 
in general more likely to receive lower and less performance based material benefits, 
which may influence their willingness to take risk.  
It may be that the public sector – on an aggregate level – recruits fewer risk-taking 
entrepreneurs than the private sector relatively speaking, due to the expectations of 
rewards or penalties of entrepreneurial activity.  
It is likely that innovative private companies are more likely to accept “failure” than 
public institutions. By “failure” is here meant innovation projects that do not 
accomplish their expected objectives.  Private companies may consider “failures” an 
integrated part of any risky enterprise, while the pressure to short term economizing 
of public funds – and not wasting the ‘public purse’ – may imply a critical 
disincentive to innovation. Overall we would then expect to see public organizations 
being risk-aversive relative to market-oriented firms, essentially due to the 
characteristics of the effective incentive system facing the two kinds of organizations. 
To reiterate: potential differences between public and private sectors in the level of 
innovation activities may be caused by 
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• a stronger co-linearity of control and funding, restricting the space of potential 
innovation strategies 
• a weaker delineation of organizational and individual change oriented incentives 
to long term performance incentives 
• inter-temporal self-selection effects, where the perception of private vs. public 
sectors as a divide between change-oriented, ‘dynamic’ sectors and static, non-
innovating sectors are being reinforced by the resources mobilized and renewed 
over time, 
• graver disincentives to innovation, though stronger ex post penalties for 
operational or functional innovation failures. 
However: In our research we have found no proof substantiating the proposition that 
public sectors are less innovative than private sectors.  
On the other hand: The Publin interviews reveal a public sector that is less willing to 
take risks. There are several reasons for this.  
In many countries the public sectors are now under the rule of various forms for new 
public management techniques (see below), where performance measurement and 
reward and funding systems have been increasingly linked to assessments based on 
predetermined sets of throughput, output and impact indicators.  
It is not a point that the integration of qualitative and quantitative indicators into 
performance and output-based funding is inherently bad – or good. To capture 
essential dimensions of the organization or activity requires careful design of these 
systems in the context of the objectives set and the functional and institutional 
requirements. To avoid that their interpretation and use solidify contemporary ‘ways 
of doing things’, implies the need of understanding the operational as well as strategic 
characteristics of the activity in question. Add to this that indicator-based reward 
systems would immediately be key parts of the explicit innovation incentive 
structures facing the organizations, a part with direct and immediate impact on the 
supply of material and immaterial resources for the activity/institution. 
Stone, paper and scissors - a simple theory of innovation in public 
activities 
It should be readily evident that any use of indicator systems such as these, would 
exert a strong pressure on the orientation of innovation strategies. If we assume that 
such indicators form a substantial part of the funding decisions by superior agencies, 
this would obviously tend to generate an inter-temporal selection environment for 
innovations. The resulting selection environment of organizational and functional 
behaviours would then select those behaviours that over time adapt best to the theory 
of the activity implied by the indicator system and its use. 
We can illustrate this with three different scenarios, based on a very simplified model. 
The model comprises three sectors: The first – sector A - is the organization or 
activity in itself. It might be an agency or directorate implementing policies in a given 
societal sphere, or it may be sectors of public service production – such as education 
or heath service. The second sector – sector F - is the policy, politics and funding 
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system for the first sector. The basic aspect of this sector here is that it sets 
unilaterally the constraints of the performance of the activity.  
The key process is the decision of allocation of resources for the first sector. We 
assume that there is a standard ‘grid’ for assessment of the activity in question, the 
score on which determines the size of the resources allocated in the next period. 
Introduce in addition a third sector – sector P, we may call it ‘the public eye’. Here is 
included the press, voting constituencies and the democratic system, the wider society 
etc. Their role is to provide the ‘assessment system’ of the superiors in this model – in 
a sense this sectors role is to appoint, demote and replace the superiors based on the  
perception in ‘the public eye’ of incumbent superiors performance. The activities in 
sector A have sector P as its ‘client base’. The possible perception gap here is between 
the supply side model of A, and the ‘demand’ or use side model of sector P. 
Each of these three has their specific mental model of the activity, the expected 
behaviour of the other sectors,  the objectives of the operations and the impact of the 
activities on the operation of the total system. Each model is complete enough to 
specify behaviours and give criteria for optimal performances beyond any reasonable 
doubt – within its analytical framework. We assume that each sector behaves 
rationally – i.e. according to the specifications and requirements of the relevant 
model. Behavioural decisions will be conditioned not just on the local theory of the 
activity, but also on the expected reactions in terms of future behaviour of the other 
sectors. 
If the models of sectors A (the service level) and F (the policy level) are equivalent in 
terms of funding implications and behavioural specifications, there should be no 
conflicts over choices of behaviours and its funding implications. The first scenario 
would thus be characterized by harmonious relations in the sense that there would be 
no battle on the theory of the activity. The innovation strategies chosen in sector A 
would have an immediate acceptance in sector F through its own mental map. 
Whether the model P (the public sphere) is equivalent or not is a mute point in the 
short run, but it may have consequences in the longer term. If it is perceived as 
sufficiently different, it would tend to demote the incumbents of sector F and appoint 
new leaders with a model of sector A more in accordance with the model of sector P. 
This would imply that the system transitioned into one of the other scenarios. 
In the other scenarios sectors A and F have different models of A. Depending on the 
relation of the P-model to these two; the long term result could be different. Since 
there for any of these sectors are two channels for the ‘battle’ of models, depending 
on the weights accorded to short term and long term goals and the perceived 
investment costs of altering the model of other sectors, the outcome of games as these 
could be different.  
However, at least in the short run, the behavioural choices of sector A would tend to 
conform with those aspects of model F captured by the performance assessment 
‘grid’. The effective system theory emerging through a description of the actual 
behaviours in sector A would increase its bias towards model F over time. Depending 
on the size of the penalties ‘for doing the wrong things’ within the funding system and 
the required costs of altering the model F, the compliance of sector A of model F 
would be stronger or weaker. What is short and long term would be the time frame 
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required to operate the triangle “downwards” (A Æ P Æ F Æ A) or “upwards” (A Æ 
F Æ P Æ B)17. 
Nowhere in this model is it assumed that any of these models are – objectively – 
‘true’. ‘Learning the reality’ comes in through a process of updating the models if the 
information feedback generated by the chosen behaviours is in sufficient conflict to 
the original expectations of the response. In the long run the model would then tend to 
generate a consensus, if the inter-sectorial interaction is sufficiently strong. Whether P 
aligns with F or with A, a compromise between the two aligned sector models would 
be likely to form the basis of the consensus. If not, a permanent situation of a tug-of-
war could ensue. 
The main outcome of this innovation theory is the importance of considering the 
‘grid’ design – the design and operation of the measurement system. The grid is a 
powerful element in shaping the development of the system and the innovation 
strategies. This applies to its relevance to all three models, and its open-endedness to 
encompass the impact of the learning processes. 
Further elements of innovation incentives 
Leaving this model behind, we note that at an individual level, an important part of 
the incentive structure would be related to job security and probabilities of promotions 
in the system. Roughly we may distinguish between tenure-based and merit-based 
systems. In some countries and in some areas of the public sector, promotions are 
more likely to be tenure-based, based on accumulated length of tenure, rather than 
merit-based. Promotions would tend to be more likely, the longer you avoid doing 
notable mistakes18. In such systems risk-evasiveness and conforming with 
expectations in innovation strategies would be rewarded more strongly than more 
risk-seeking strategies.  
Tenure-based models would probably be more likely to facilitate the generation of 
collective models or ‘belief systems’, both within and between organizations. If so 
they would tend to increase the likelihood of collective strategies and behaviours – to 
ease the alignment of individual choices and strategies. 
On the other hand a strongly merit-based system could lead to the preponderance of 
overly risk-seeking choices; the possible rewards for success may substantially 
outweigh the alternatives, unless the penalties are sufficiently strong. If the reward 
systems are individualistic, this suggests that such systems in contrast to tenure-based 
systems would increase the costs of establishing collective belief systems and 
strategies. 
The point here is not that one of these systems is ‘better’ than the other – the striking 
of a balance between them is one important part of the design of an overall innovation 
incentive system. Where the balance should be struck will probably not have a general 
answer, but will depend on the functionalities and institutional structure of each 
activity. 
 
17 Within the logic of this schematic model, F is the ‘superior’ of A, P is the ‘superior’ of F, while A is 
the ‘superior’ of P, and similarly for ‘subsidiarity’ in the other direction. 
18 In line with Sir Humphrey’s law noted above, this is formulated in the Minister’s proposition; “since 
there are virtually no goals or targets that can be achieved by a civil servant personally, his high IQ is 
usually devoted to the avoidance of error”. 
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Secondly, the media is becoming increasingly interested in the public sector, and 
especially in public sector malpractice.  Any “personal interest” story revealing a 
public sector “scandal” is likely to sell. The good side of this is that the media really 
does function as a watch dog revealing incompetence and systemic failure in the 
public sector. The problem is that this scrutiny is likely to make public sector 
employees less likely to take chances, i.e. implement more radical innovations. This 
applies to the service level as well as the policy level. A scandal of this kind may well 
ruin the career of a politician as well as of a high level civil servant.  
The solution to this problem is obviously not to accept malpractice or uninhibited 
spending of public money. However, it should be possible to get politicians, public 
sector managers and the press to accept that the risk for failure is an integrated part of 
any innovation strategy, and that failed innovation projects in fact are a vital aspect of 
innovation strategies – without failures the overall innovation strategies are failures. 
On supplier-client interfaces 
It can be argued that the public and private sectors differ as regards the interaction 
with their end user, whether these are defined as “customers”, “clients” or “citizens”. 
Private companies will normally interact with their customers on a daily basis, and 
unless the company is too large, the information gained by this interaction will find its 
way to the managers quickly. Ultimately, a company that fails its customers will be in 
dire straits. “If they don’t by, you die!” This is also why companies often spend 
considerable amounts of money on market research. They need additional information 
on what the customers demand today and what they will request in the future. 
In the public sector things are not so clear cut. There may indeed be a direct 
interaction between the service provider’s front office and the user of these services, 
but there is not necessarily a good feedback loop to the local management, or – which 
is even more important – leading public officials higher up in the hierarchy. This may 
impair the learning process of the whole system. 
The table below, which is fetched from the Publin D9 report, highlights many of the 
main differences between public and private sector organizations that are relevant to 
innovation. It does so in a necessarily exaggerated way – the contrasts made are 
sometimes rather extreme ones – to underline the points of difference. Some private 
sector organizations are more like public sector ones (especially, but not only, parts of 
the non-profit sector), and some public sector organizations more like private ones 
(especially some semi-autonomous quasi-governmental organizations and state owned 
companies).    
The table does attempt, however, to capture some of the major changes that have been 
underway in public sector management.  While not a thorough mapping of the 
systems of innovation in the public and private worlds, it does contain enough 
material on elements of these systems to demonstrate that they appear to vary 
considerably across the sectors.  Accordingly, we would anticipate differences in the 
motivation for innovation, the selection processes that shape innovations, the ways in 
which the innovation process is constricted and the effects that it has. 
That being said, we must not underestimate the diversity of public services. 
Universities are not very much like military bases, for instance, and even within a 
sector like the health service there are immense differences between, say, the 
ambulance service and dental surgeries.   
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Nor should we draw too sharp a distinction between “competitive” private markets 
and “bureaucratic” public hierarchies.  Some public services are only one player in 
areas where markets also exist for private provision – e.g. education and health in 
many countries. There are non-market forms of competition: There is competition for 
positions as well as for funding. 
Archetypal Features of Private and Public Sectors and their possible relations to the 
Propensity and Direction of Innovation (From Publin report D9) 
 Private Sector Public Sector 
Organising 
Principles Pursuit of Profit, of Stability or of Growth 
of Revenues.  
– Changing market conditions may require 
innovations to enhance perceived value 
for money or generate new products.  
Market as a selection process for 
innovations: business cycles create 
periods of relative austerity and prosperity 
for many firms, and can be related to 
investor willingness to support innovative 
sectors and start-ups. 
Enactment of Public Policies. 
- New and Changing Policies may require 
Innovations of many kinds  Often the problems 
with which these policies are meant to contend 
are highly complex, not always well-
understood, and policies may thus have 
contradictory effects. The political cycle as a 
selection process debates alternative policy 
directions, and opportunities to restructure 
public organizations. 
Organizational 
Structures 
Firms of many sizes, with options for new 
entrants.  
– Large firms can have dedicated 
innovation budgets; new entrants may be 
forged around innovative products; 
different firms may experiment with 
innovations of different kinds. 
 
Complex system of organizations with various 
(and to some extent conflicting) tasks  
 
-  Many innovations have to be fitted into a 
massive complex of organizational structures, 
and “rolled out” in a politically acceptable way 
given concerns about social equity and 
economic efficiency. 
Performance 
Metrics 
Return on Investment  
– While some innovations are hard to 
cost-justify (e.g. IT infrastructure), many 
can be quantified in terms of increased 
sales, profits etc. 
Multiple performance indicators and targets  
-  These often relate to streamlining 
organizational structures and achieving best 
practice in the terms decided and implemented 
as top-down policy.  Benefits f innovations are 
often hard to quantify, or those achievements 
that are apparent are hard to value in strictly 
financial and budgetary terms.   
Management 
Issues  
Some managers have considerable 
autonomy, others constrained by 
shareholders, corporate governance, or 
financial stringency.  Successful 
managers liable to be rewarded with 
substantial material benefits and 
promotion.   
– Variation among firms in ability to 
innovate and take risks in general. 
Managers liable to pursue innovations that 
they believe will be successful in meeting 
company objectives – and thus in 
furthering their own careers.  One of the 
most substantiated results in the 
innovation literature is that successful 
innovations typically require product 
champions who are prepared to take risks 
and continue to support innovations 
through the difficult periods often 
encountered in early phases of 
development and/or implementation. 
While there are efforts to emulate private 
sector management practice, mangers are 
typically under high levels of political scrutiny. 
Successful managers likely to receive lower 
material benefits than comparable private 
sector managers.   
– Major innovations are likely to require 
approval of political masters – or even to be 
demanded and/or specified by them.  The role 
of championing an innovation may be thrust 
upon a manager – though proactive managers 
can also promote major innovations to their 
political superiors, and may be able to proceed 
with less visible innovations with little 
interference. Managers motivated not only by 
aims of furthering their own careers through 
being associated with successful innovations, 
but also by pursuit of public service objectives. 
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Relations with:  
~ End-Users 
Markets may be consumer or industrial 
ones, and firms vary in the intimacy of 
their links with the end-users of their 
products, but typically market feedback 
provides the verdict on innovation.  
– Innovation often motivated by need to 
maintain or increase market share, and 
one of the most substantiated results in 
the innovation literature relates success in 
innovation to understanding of end user 
requirements. 
End-users are the general public, traditionally 
seen as citizens, though recently there have 
been efforts to introduce market-type 
principles and move to see them as customers 
or consumers.  
– “Customer relations” have often been 
underdeveloped, with an assumption that 
public servants know best about what services 
are required, and thus about relevant 
innovations. The customer side on the 
relationship is somewhat different from in 
private sector: price is not necessarily a 
market feedback mechanisms; the customers 
often pay a stipulated sum and the state the 
rest (often the difference in costs between 
various actors) The marketing strategies are 
different: the public sector is not an eager 
seller, the customer role require active 
information seeking citizens. The 
services/products “sold” has more far-reaching 
personal consequences in medical, health, 
social, educational effects etc than most of the 
products/services in the private sector. 
 
~ Supply Chains Most firms are parts of one or more supply 
chains, with larger firms tending to 
organise these chains.  
-  Smaller firms may find their innovation 
trajectories shaped by the ways in which 
large players in supply chins seek to 
specify details of their products and 
production processes, their stockholding, 
delivery, order management and 
transactional procedures (e.g. use of 
ecommerce systems) 
Public sector is typically dependent on private 
suppliers for much of its equipment, and is a 
very important market for many firms.  
– Scope for public procurement to impose 
standards and other features on suppliers; 
scope for suppliers to introduce innovations 
into the public sector (e.g. new computer 
equipment, pharmaceuticals). 
~ Employees Nature of workforce varies considerably, 
and relations between employees and 
management range from fractious to 
harmonious. Efforts are made in some 
firms to instil company loyalty and/or a 
customer-centric approach, but employee 
motivations are often mainly economic 
ones of securing a reasonable income. 
– Employees rarely consulted about 
technological and organizational change, 
though they may be encouraged to make 
suggestions as to how to improve the 
company’s products. 
Public sector employees are typically highly 
unionised (economists and social scientists in 
the central administration and health- and 
social professionals as nurses, social workers, 
child-care workers, teachers etc in the public 
services).  Many are also professional workers 
organised through professional associations. 
While usual concerns about status and salary 
are experienced, many workers enter public 
service with idealistic motivations.  
-  Workforce may be able to use industrial 
action to oppose innovations seen as 
threatening quantity or quality of jobs or 
services.   Professional workforce may bring 
innovation-related knowledge from their 
associations and networks – but are also 
relatively well-placed to try to adapt 
innovations so as to maintain professional 
status and working conditions. Conflicts 
among professionals might facilitate and 
restrain innovations.  Workforce may seek to 
introduce and influence innovations in order to 
improve quality of public services. 
~  Sources of 
Knowledge 
Companies have considerable flexibility in 
sourcing innovation-related information 
 
Despite large resources, parts of the public 
sector may be constrained from using private 
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from consultants, trade associations, and 
public sector researchers, but many 
smaller firms have limited resources to do 
so.  
– Much knowledge is generated privately 
and efforts to retain intellectual property 
may constrain the diffusion of certain 
innovations and underpinning knowledge.  
There is believed to be considerable 
variation across different sectors in terms 
of the extent to which systems of 
innovation give firms access to relevant 
knowledge of new technical and other 
developments.. 
sources of knowledge (other than those of 
suppliers).  Public sector sources of 
knowledge (e.g. Universities) may be highly 
oriented to other parts of the public sector 
 
– The public sector is able to make use of a 
wide range of sources of innovation-relevant 
information and knowledge.  Recently efforts 
are being made to make public sector 
organizations more aware of intellectual 
property issues: while this is intended to 
enhance innovation efforts, this result is by no 
means guaranteed.  
Time Horizon Short-term in many sectors, though 
utilities and infrastructural services may 
have very long horizons  
-  Innovations typically need to pay off in 
the shorter term, though some firms do 
invest strategically in the hope of major 
long-term advantages. 
 
Often long-term (this means that responsible 
decision-makers may have moved on by the 
time that results are achieved) though many 
decisions do have shorter horizons.  
 
-  It may be difficult to assess the 
consequences of innovation in the short term.  
Major investments may need to be sustained 
over long periods. 
Source: (further elaborated version) based on Ian Miles (2004) – see also Tan (2004) for a less elaborate view. 
On the “privatization” of the public sector 
There is a commonly held belief that the incentive structure of the private sector 
generate more innovation than the one found in the public sector. This has lead to a 
drive towards “privatization” of the public sector, in the meaning of making public 
institutions more like private ones. The fact that the belief is wrong has not hindered 
its use as a key rationale for policy thinking on ‘modernization’ or ‘streamlining’ of 
the public sectors in many countries. 
A common set of strategies to achieve such streamlining can be outlines as follows. It 
has been done: 
1. By replacing hierarchical contracts with market contracts (public services buy 
and sell services between themselves). 
2. By using private and third sector service provider to carry out work financed 
and controlled by the public sector – i.e. by exposing public services to 
competition. 
3. By introducing new systems for measuring production and efficiency and 
through linking funding to performance (New Public Management) 
4. By giving public institutions more autonomy and responsibility (the extreme 
version is turning them into publicly owned companies). 
5. By substitution of publicly-planned provision with private services for market 
provision (i.e. the public sector leaves these services to the private market). 
As pointed out in Publin report D9, On the differences between public and private 
sector innovation,  neo-Tayloristic principles is partly replacing hierarchical contracts 
with market contracts in the public sector. A major reason for this is that governments 
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believe that this will encourage (or force) public service providers to innovate and 
produce cheaper and more effective services. 
This is often achieved by establishing specialized units that offer a limited number of 
services. These services are offered in quasi-market arrangements, with clear 
separation between the public contractor and the public provider, between buyer and 
seller. Thus a market-based financing of public organizations becomes a supplement 
or alternative to the traditional budget-financing, and in line with the creation of more 
economically autonomous units in public sector, more is expected of head of 
departments etc. with respect to economic control and reporting.  
Another expression of the substitution of hierarchical contracts with market contracts 
is the shift from the state as the monopolist provider of public services, to the use of 
private providers of public services. Outsourcing is one example of this, but also state 
support of private institutions (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, etc), and the 
privatization of state oned companies (like railways, telephone providers and 
electrical plants).             
The term privatization is, however, also used to describe situations in which public 
services are exposed to competition. In this case, the delivery of services remains a 
public responsibility, but the public may pay public, private or third sector 
organizations to provide these services.  
The point here is simply that the term “privatization” can have different meanings, 
and that a great deal of the recent changes within – for instance – Scandinavian 
welfare systems are not pure forms of privatization, but rather a process of 
establishing new contractual relationships, and of increased differentiation and 
interaction among the various parts of the public sector and private sector, and within 
public sector itself.  
Privatization or the exposure to competition of formerly public activities has created a 
need for new regulations and new organizations to enforce them. It also calls for 
reformed regulation following the deregulation of certain financial processes, for 
instance with the increased level of establishment of public-owned corporations. 
There is an overall need to develop the appropriate combination of economic 
instruments and regulation to meet the development of an expanded and integrated 
economic system. A great proportion of the instruments of institutional innovation in 
the public sector relate to the development of different kinds of contracting, both 
short- and long-term19.  
 
 
19 See Bogen & Nyen (1998), Klausen & Ståhlberg (1998)(chap. 4.) 
  
The New Public Management philosophy (NPM) is part of this process and has 
transformed the role of the public sector in many countries and in many sectors. There 
is more attention on output and the results of public sector activity, accompanied by 
new indicators for measuring efficiency and expenditure. The individual public 
organizations are held responsible and accountable for the achievement of certain 
targets. The state budgetary system acts as controlling and rewarding mechanism of 
the public sector activity through established performance measures. Hence, the 
performance based money transfer system is intended to act as strategic and 
operational planning guidelines. NPM is clearly inspired by methodologies developed 
for the private sector, and can therefore be considered part of the “privatization” 
movement mentioned above 
The adoption of terms such as “customers” instead of for instance “citizen” to 
describe the users of public services is one of the main features of the new movement 
towards characterizing the public sector in terms of the market. The term “customer” 
indicates freedom of choice in buying services in a market and implies effective 
market relationships between buyers and sellers.  
New Public Management 
A significant body of literature exists on NPM. Discussions concerning NPM are 
typified by some or all of the following characteristics: 
  
• “Private sector styles of management principles: a move away from 
bureaucracy-style to greater flexibility and new techniques.  
• Competition in public sector: rivalry is the key to lower costs and better 
standards. Use of public tendering procedures and term contracts. 
• Disaggregate units: break up formerly monolithic units and create 
manageable units where production and provision interests are separated. 
Efficiency advantages of use of contract or franchise arrangements inside 
and outside the public sector. 
• Hands-on professional management: active, visible, discretionary control of 
organizations from named persons at the top. Accountability requires clear 
assignment of responsibility for action, not diffusion of power. 
• Explicit standards and measures of performance: definition of goals, targets 
and indicators of success, preferably expressed in quantitative terms. 
Accountability requires clear statement of goals, efficiency requires “hard 
look” at objectives. 
• Output controls: need to stress results rather than procedures. Break-up of 
centralized bureaucracy-wide personnel management, resource allocation 
and rewards linked to measured performance. 
• Discipline and parsimony: need to check resource demands of public sector 
and do more with less. Cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resting 
union demands.” 
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Adopting the “customer” perspective in public administration might cause a re-think 
about the foundations of the public sector’s role. However, it might be argued that the 
use of such terms is mainly symbolic. The concept of “customers” has been adopted 
in many areas of public administration for which it is inappropriate and does not make 
sense at all. When, for example, public agencies allocate funding to regional 
development projects, these actors cannot be described as customers. Moreover, the 
relationship between the public authority and the other actors is not a price-regulated 
relationship. 
However, the shift towards a practice of treating the citizen as a customer may lead to 
a real change in the relationship between the citizen and the public sector. The 
traditional relationship or social contract between the citizen and the state is based on 
reciprocal rights and responsibilities. The individual has responsibilities towards the 
community. A customer has, on the other hand, no responsibility towards the 
company providing services, except one: to pay for the bill. Hence people considering 
themselves to be customers may loose the sense of solidarity or communality that has 
Personalization of Social Services  
From Publin Report No. D18 Innovation in the social sector – case study analysis, by Ludmila 
Malikova and Katarina Staroňová 
A key phenomenon in western countries is the gradual personalization of social services, 
regardless of the type of service. Thus, services for elderly, special education or pension 
reform, all have features of search for tailoring the services to the needs of individual 
person, with the possibility of choice. This trend has its roots in New Public Management 
where the responsibility for person’s own social status is shifted towards the citizen and 
his/her ability to choose among various possibilities. In special education, the specially 
designed instruction and services provided by the school district or other local education 
agency aspire to meet the unique needs of students identified as disabled. Special 
education may include instruction in a general education or special education classroom. 
The pension reform in Ireland was designed to deal with the more immediate problems 
associated with supplementary pension coverage in order to bridge the gap in coverage in 
a way that was accessible, flexible and responsive to the needs of individuals. This was to 
be a major new vehicle through which supplementary pension cover could be improved.  
The development of an individual retirement savings account product in the form of 
PRSAs marks a significant policy development and product innovation in the context of 
the Irish pension system. 
In transition countries, the shift in philosophy – i.e. the new orientation towards the client1 
- became the centre of all innovative efforts that focused on the ‘humanization’ of the 
environment, gradual de-institutionalization of social care and improvement of the 
relations between the staff / facility and the client. This innovative approach in the 
transition context, though common in the developed countries, was reflected in both 
Slovakia and Lithuania in a range of new features ranging from creation of alternative 
services, physical improvements in the facilities, introduction of new (personalized) 
services according to the clients’ needs and related free-time activities for senior citizens, 
to the introduction of quality standards and performance management to secure minimum 
standards in the services provided. 
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been included in the traditional social democratic, social liberal and conservative 
ideologies.  
The Publin researcher Séamus O’Tuama points to the connection between New Public 
Management and what he calls neo-liberalism (O’Tuama 2005b). He argues that in 
putting the terms consumer and customers to compete with citizenship the neo-
liberals are attempting to counter the collectivist excesses of the welfare state while at 
the simultaneously relabelling aspects of the citizenship that underpinned it. This has 
indeed led to a lot of innovation – and even much needed reform – but the danger is 
that it undermines the glue that holds society together: a sense of responsibility for the 
community as a whole. 
The problem is therefore to develop a system that does include innovation and 
accountability, but at the same time retains the role of the public sector as a vehicle 
for equal rights and solidarity.  
The innovation process in the public sector 
From personal memo written by Permanent Secretary Sir Humphrey Appleby:  
 
“Wolley came at 5.15 p.m. to discuss the £32 million saved by the [North-West 
Regional] controller. I remarked I was aghast. Wooley said he was also aghast, and 
that it was incredible that we new nothing of this. He sometimes reveals himself as 
worryingly naïf. I of course, know all about it. I am merely aghast that it has got out. It 
might result in our getting less money from the Treasury in next year’s [Public 
Expenditure Scrutiny Committee] review. […]  
 
I asked him why he was looking worried. He revealed that he genuinely wanted the 
[Department of Administrative Affairs] to save money. This was shocking. Clearly he 
has not yet grasped the fundamentals of our work.  
 
There has to be some way to measure success in the Service. British Leyland can 
measure success by the size of its profits. […] However, the Civil Service does not 
make profits or losses. Ergo, we measure success by the size of our staff and our 
budget.  By definition a big department is more successful than a small one.   
 
It seems extraordinary that Wolley would have passed through the Civil Service 
College without having understood that this simple proposition is the basis of our 
whole system. 
From The Complete Yes Minister, by Jonathan Lynn and Anthony Jay, BBC Books, 
Chatam 2003, British TV comedy 
The various forms of privatization are both types of public innovation and vehicles 
for stimulating innovative activities in the public sector. They do tend to blur the lines 
between the public and the private sector, both as regards incentive structures and 
governance models. Still, one should keep in mind that large sections of the public 
sector are not market driven in any normal sense of the word. Moreover, even if 
companies, NGOs and public institutions may compete for government contracts, the 
public buyer itself, being this a ministry, an agency or a public institution, is not part 
of an open market. 
Why should public organizations innovate, when they are not challenged by 
competition in the market or confront a need to expand in order to survive in the 
market? Publin Report D9 points to two classes of reasons.   
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First, there are political reasons.  The public sector does not as a whole face the test of 
competitive markets, but politicians and political parties in Western democracies face 
the test of competitive electoral politics.  Political support and votes are gained 
through being seen to perform better than opposing political actors, and the provision, 
delivery, and cost of public services is an important domain for competition between 
claims of effective (potential) performance. 
Second, there are more personal reasons.  Public sector policy makers, managers and 
workers gain satisfaction – and status among their peers – from improving public 
services.  
Moreover, there are procedures for complaints and control embedded in most public 
services. These may not be perfect, and citizens may find it hard to get anywhere with 
complaints, but if they succeed both public employees, their bosses and the 
responsible politicians may get into serious trouble. 
The policy level 
Political actors may have some of the same personal qualities as are attributed to 
entrepreneurs.  They may try to realise a particular vision of how society should work 
– including, for example, notions of when and how public services should be helping 
people achieve their aspirations and secure their quality of life.    In the Publin 
research, the case of NHS Direct – a telephone helpline for health services in the UK 
– was promoted in the high levels of government.  
Politicians do not necessarily have an in-depth understanding of new technological 
potentials in a particular area or of new management theories.  But they are often 
highly committed to improving social welfare or achieving particular outcomes from 
public services.  They may thus seek innovative solutions, consulting with various 
sources for policy advice.  In the course of Publin studies, it has been suggested that 
some politicians may promote very radical changes in public services, since they can 
see a chance to make their mark on society – and, it is further suggested, the risk may 
be low as they will probably have moved on to other fields if the particular innovation 
proves to be a failure.  
The ability to convince other strategic actors is central for political actors as it is for 
economic entrepreneurs.  In innovation studies there has been much focus on the actor 
networks and socio-technical constituencies required to develop and push through 
major innovations. In short: The “radical” politicians (which can be found at both 
ends of the political spectrum) need extensive networks and an ability to convince and 
engender enthusiasm. 
In contradiction to Weber’s ideal bureaucracy, with a clear-cut dividing line between 
the hierarchical subordinated civil servants to the political leadership, the civil 
servants often play important roles in the decision-making processes. Given the size 
and the heterogeneity of public sector, no politician is able to obtain deep insight into 
all policy areas. Politicians often specialise in one or some few policy areas, but are 
not able to gain the professionalism of the bureaucrats. Civil servants have 
professional education and qualification, are full-time employed and have also often 
lifetime careers within their specialized field of the bureaucratic system. Politicians do 
not necessarily have the same background, or the opportunities to explore policy areas 
in such depth. 
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In ministries civil servants are engaged in policy development work. Hence both 
politicians and civil servants can be considered policy makers. This group of policy 
oriented civil servants extends to various policy agencies, councils and directories that 
often have as an explicit role to give advice to politicians. These are often politically 
interested persons with a drive towards policy development and reform. Policy change 
is also a form of innovation, and they can thus be called innovators or entrepreneurs 
even. 
The traditional picture of the top level civil servant is Sir Humphrey in the British TV 
comedy Yes Minister!, a very intelligent man doing his best to keep the status quo and 
to keep the minister from implementing any sensible reform. And indeed, such civil 
servants exist. Thus, civil servants might both a source to innovation and hamper 
innovation. Their professional background and insight into the policy area might give 
them quite other views than the ones held by the government in power. Civil servants 
might argue that the new policy will not work, based on their own gained experience 
of the system, and might actively try to influence on the decision making process with 
their knowledge of how the policy should be best be framed.  
Their views are of course also based certain belief systems, world views, schools of 
thinking or – even – ideologies. If these views conflict with the ones of the ruling 
politicians, they may – consciously or unconsciously – do their best to stop the new 
policies from being implemented.  
The structure of belief systems 
 Deep Core Policy Core Secondary Aspects 
Defining 
characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
Susceptibility to 
change 
 
 
 
Type of learning 
 
 
Fundamental normative 
and ontological axioms 
 
 
 
Examples: 
The nature of man: 
inherently evil or socially 
redeemable; the relative 
priority of various 
ultimate values: freedom, 
security, health, 
knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Across all policy 
subsystems 
 
Very difficult; akin to a 
religious conversion 
 
 
 
Social learning 
Fundamental policy positions 
concerning the basic strategies 
for achieving core values 
within the subsystem 
 
Examples: 
Identification of key issues 
and groups whose welfare is 
of greatest concern; proper 
distribution of authority 
between government and 
market; proper distribution of 
authority among levels of 
government; priority accorded 
to policy instruments 
(regulation, covenants, 
economic instruments); 
technological optimism vs. 
pessimism 
 
Specific to a subsystem 
 
 
Difficult but can occur if 
experience reveals serious 
anomalies 
 
 
Problem learning, social 
learning 
Instrumental decisions 
and information searches 
necessary to implement 
policy core 
 
Examples 
Seriousness of specific 
aspects of the problem in 
specific locales; causal 
links; efficacy of 
administrative rules, and 
policies, appropriateness 
of funding arrangements 
and budgets; statutory 
interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
Specific to a subsystem or 
a sub-subsystem 
 
Moderately easy; this is 
the topic of most 
administrative and even 
legislative policy making 
 
Instrumental learning 
 
From Publin report D15, Policy learning, what does it mean and how can we study it. Adapted 
from Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993, p. 221) 
To give one example: the Publin researchers have in many countries heard the story 
about the mighty Ministry of Finance or Treasury, staffed with civil servants well 
versed in the school of traditional macroeconomics, and with a strong felt 
responsibility for keeping “irresponsible” ministries in check. Given that power is 
money, this often leads to intense struggles between the staff of the Ministry of 
Finance and the policy makers in other ministries. The values systems found in 
ministries of culture or ministries of the environment differ often wildly from 
ministries of industry or the Foreign Offices.  
It should be noted, though, that such differences may also lead to innovation, as the 
interaction between different ministerial cultures may lead to the dissemination of 
new ideas, and hence innovation. 
 
Innovation at the policy level is based on policy learning, i.e. the ability of the policy 
makers to learn what is needed in order to change behaviour. It should be noted that 
policy makers are experts in their own right. Not only do present day policy makers 
have extensive education; they may also develop a good sense of the written and 
unwritten rules of the public service, knowledge outsiders – including researchers – 
often lack. 
Policy makers need to know about 
 
Policy maker
NGOs 
Politicians
Public debate 
Research  
institutions 
Consultants 
•Learning 
•Networking
•Innovation 
Other policy institutions
International setting 
 
Political system 
 
Regulatory 
framework Cultural environment 
 
The public innovation systems as seen from the perspective of the policy maker 
 the ideas and attitudes of the ruling politicians (even the ideas they 
didn’t know they had) 
 the formal rules of the game (how to handle parliament, how to present 
a white paper) 
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 the informal rules of the game (how not to embarrass your minister) 
 channels of influence (who is in and who is out) 
 communication (how to present complex ideas in a convincing way so 
that they are understood and accepted) 
 project coordination 
 sources of information 
 international trends 
However, these learning processes may be impeded by a lack of resources, being that 
time to find, understand and make use of competences found outside the relevant unit, 
or money to buy research and consultancy services. Inter-departmental or inter-
ministerial haggling may, moreover, weaken the cooperation and learning needed to 
develop broad based strategies. Moreover, any policy level entrepreneur needs 
acceptance at the top level, i.e. the institution must encourage learning and change. 
The service level 
Traditionally, the role of the public employees has been to be hierarchical 
subordinated the political leadership and the bureaucracy. The public employees have 
not been expected to come up with good ideas of how to change the public services, 
but rather to deliver the public services framed by the political actors. This especially 
applies to civil servants found in the system below the ministries.  
Although institutions are the result of human activity, they are not necessarily 
products of conscious design. The preferred models are rather taken for granted, 
assuming that “actors associate certain actions with certain situations by rules of 
appropriateness (March and Olsen 1984: pp.741)” through socialization, educations, 
on-the-job learning or acquiescence to convention (Lærgreid and Olsen 1978; March 
and Olsen 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Olsen 1992). 
Hence, even though the role of the public employees is changing in many countries, 
the public employees still find it hard to be innovative because their role in the public 
system as mere service providers and producers is institutionalised. Moreover, the 
institutionalised role might be hard to change because the public system still demand 
the production and providing of specific described public services, described and 
controlled through the state budget system. For that reason, it might be hard to find 
opportunity space from the demanded tasks to be innovative. Thus, the resources, in 
capital, time and manpower might restrain the entrepreneurial activity. 
Certain structures and processes evolve historically through selective experience and 
become the basis of self-organization. Institutions develop considerable robustness 
against changes in the environment, including explicit reform efforts. The members 
do enter the organization with individually shaped ideas, expectations, agendas, 
values, interests and abilities. Still, they are often soon “socialized” into the local 
culture, and may often adapt the belief systems found in that organization.  Members 
who do not agree to the institutionalized norms and preferences will often find few if 
any venues to voice the incongruence between personal and institutional preferences, 
the result being either a exit from the organization or a revaluation of own 
preferences. This selection mechanism leads to a further institutionalization of 
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existing practices, and is strengthened by the fact that many employers tend to employ 
people with similar belief systems and educational backgrounds as themselves. 
This does not mean that it is impossible to innovate in such organizations. Within the 
limits set by the ruling belief system and the existing policies, both managers and 
employers will try to solve the problems facing them, and problem solving is an 
important form of innovation. 
However, such activities require that the employees are encouraged to innovate and 
that an entrepreneurial spirit is at least tolerated, if not supported. This type of 
entrepreneurial spirit among the public employees is slightly similar to the one found 
among political entrepreneurs:  
 
• They may be ideologically inclined to innovate i.e. they have a word view 
or a rationality that makes them believe that change is necessary. 
• They may be idealists or altruists.  They have found work in the public 
sector because they “want to make a change”. 
• By proposing innovations they may further their own careers. It is 
certainly true that organizations may oppose radical changes, but it may 
nevertheless appreciate “fixers” and “doers” that are able to get the leaders 
out of a tight spot. 
• They may be intellectually curious or they may find the need for change an 
interesting challenge. The fact that the public sector in European countries 
employs a large number of highly educated personnel makes this even 
more likely. 
Moreover, the public sector is characterized by large heterogeneity. In many areas 
there is room for more radical innovation, especially if the area is put under some kind 
of stress or external shocks. A political crisis may lead to demands for reform. A 
scandal, let us say too many deaths caused by negligence or malpractice in public 
hospitals, may force through new practices. Moreover, such shocks may bring in new 
managers with new ideas about what has to be done. An extreme example of this kind 
of shock is the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The post-communist countries have 
faced an ongoing revolution in public service provision, partly requiring a 
replacement of the “old guard.”  
The system of innovation 
If we take the need for innovation for granted, and also argue – as we do – that 
innovation is an integrated part of public sector activities, it will be interesting to map 
social factors that stimulate innovation and those that hinder the application of new 
ways of doing things. 
Publin is based on a systemic approach to innovation. We have looked at the 
innovating unit, this being an organization, organizational department or and 
individual, and studied how this unit learn. Innovation processes are normally 
initiated in order to solve specific problems, this being the inability of a hospital to 
treat the required number of patients, the need to heal a certain disease or the need to 
coordinate health policies in a better way. In order to solve such problems, i.e. change 
their behaviour, these actors must be able to learn. This is why Publin consider 
learning and innovation to intertwined phenomena. 
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In order to learn and innovate, the actors must interact with other actors, this being 
people, organizations or various sources of information. Their ability to innovate is 
dependent on their ability to find such relevant competences, understand them and 
make use of them. We are using the word “competences” deliberately here. 
Information, being that any codified presentation of data, is of no value unless you 
have the competences needed to interpret it.  
The better the actors are at developing networks that can help them get access to 
relevant competences and partners that can help them in their learning processes, the 
greater are the chances that their innovation processes will succeed. 
These innovation networks may be informal, i.e. dependent on individuals working in 
the public organization. A network may be used on an ad hoc basis, i.e. to solve a 
“small” problem that needs a solution right now. Hence a ministerial policy maker 
may call a colleague in the Directorate of Health, in order to get input to a new policy 
strategy, and a nurse in a local hospital may call a colleague he met on a conference in 
order to discuss the use of a new method of treatment. 
However, these networks may also be used in more systematic innovation processes, 
where the organization as a whole has decided to start an innovation process aimed at 
solving a particular problem. This may for instance entail discussions with private 
companies delivering machinery, equipment or services, and may also in some cases 
involve research institutions. The figure below is a presentation of an institutional 
network for learning and innovation. 
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One may also look at this innovation process from a non-institutional point of view. 
In the following figure we have put the individual “innovation” in the centre, i.e. the 
final solution to the problem at hand. Around it we have placed the various types of 
demands, competences and technologies that shape the innovation process. 
When reading this figure, the following should be kept in mind: 
Ministry Local authority Public agency NGO 
Company  
(service 
provider) 
Other health 
institutions 
CORE 
INSITUTION 
Sub branches of 
main 
organization 
Company  
(technology 
provider) 
Institution 
providing health 
services 
Main coordinator 
of innovation Third sector 
service provider 
Users/clients 
Citizens 
R&D department 
in company 
University 
department 
Government 
laboratory 
Research 
institute 
Simplified model of a knowledge community seen from the institutional viewpoint. Normally only a few of 
these institutional types will be involved in a specific innovation process. There will be interaction 
between many of the parties involved. 
• There is no clear demarcation between in-house competences and 
competences delivered by outsiders. Some problems may be solved by the 
employees of the institution alone; other problems require cooperation with 
others. Moreover, the use of competences developed elsewhere requires 
relevant in-house competences, i.e. the employees must have the educational 
background and the experience required to communicate with the outside 
helpers. 
• In this figure we include all kinds of sources of innovation, including 
competences needed for organizational change and the improvement of 
service deliveries, as well as the acquisition of new physical technologies, 
including new equipment and machinery. Again there is no clear dividing line 
between the various types of knowledge transfer. The use of a new machine 
also requires learning, being that the ability to use the machine or the 
underlying competences needed to understand its function as a part of a larger 
process. There is no point in buying a digital x-ray machine, if you know no 
medicine. 
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Political objectives Public opinion  Social needs 
Existing in house 
competences 
Availability of new or 
improved technology 
Availability of new or 
improved service 
INNOVATION New in house learning 
processes (i.e. a solution to a 
particular problem 
involving change of 
behavior) 
May be the 
development of a 
product, process, 
service or 
organizational 
reform. 
Availability of new 
scientific knowledge In house R&D 
Availability of new 
general technologies 
(e.g. ICT) 
New R&D specific to 
this innovation process 
Advice and knowledge 
from external 
expertise 
Knowledge and 
innovation 
management 
capabilities 
New competences 
(recruits) 
Simplified model of innovation process sources of knowledge and competences. The learning and 
innovation process relies on an efficient flow of knowledge. 
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On the basis of this model we can stipulate that successful innovation, i.e. innovation 
processes that leads to a solution to the problem at hand, requires: 
• Networks 
o Access to relevant in-house competences 
o Access to relevant competences outside of the organization (networks) 
o In-house competences needed to find, understand and make use of 
outside competences and technology 
• Culture and organization 
o An in-house culture that encourages – or at least allows – such learning 
and innovation processes 
o An in-house organizational structure that supports such learning and 
innovation processes 
Given that any public organization or unit is part of a larger hierarchy, the last point 
may be extended to include other organizations in the public sector. The innovative 
capabilities of a hospital may be strengthened or weakened by policies made by – let’s 
say – the Directorate of Health. Furthermore, the directorate’s ability to innovate 
requires a close interaction with the Ministry of Health. In this respect public 
institutions differ from private companies, where the chain of command is normally 
much shorter. 
Given the systemic nature of innovation, any analysis of the innovative capabilities of 
public organizations, must take their innovation culture and networking abilities into 
consideration. We must find out what engenders innovation and what hinders it.  
In report D19 Innovation in the health sector – case study analysis, Paul Cunningham 
lists several barriers to innovation in the health sector, as well as drivers. They can 
serve as examples of framework conditions influencing the innovative capabilities of 
institutions as well as individuals. The following text is based on his analysis. 
Barriers and drivers 
From the Minister’s diary: “I am now able to draw some conclusions about the Civil 
Service in general and Sir Humphrey in particular.  I begin to see that senior civil 
servant in the open structure have, surprisingly enough, almost as brilliant minds as 
they themselves would claim to have. However, since there are virtually no goals or 
targets that can be achieved by a civil servant personally, his high IQ is usually 
devoted to the avoidance of error.” 
Excerpt from the book The Complete Yes Minister, by Jonathan Lynn and Anthony 
Jay, BBC Books, Chatam 2003. 
Barriers 
The public health systems studied appear to share a number of common features 
which could act in a way to hinder or prevent the process of innovation. Although a 
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number of categories have been identified, they are rarely mutually exclusive and one 
barrier may be the cause or effect of one or several others in a complex interplay. 
Size and complexity: Typically, the public health sector comprises an extremely 
complex and large-scale organizational entity, composed of multiple-tiered 
interlinked systems. In turn, these often exhibit: huge staff numbers20; a large range of 
professional, semi-professional and ancillary occupations; and a diversity of 
organizational arrangements and service processes. This size and complexity can 
generate additional factors that hinder the innovation process, such as localised skills 
shortages and gaps, lack of clear agreement with respect to perceived problems, 
approaches and solutions, and communication (particularly knowledge management) 
difficulties. Typically, such large-scale organizations are prone to the development of 
internal barriers (the “walls and ceilings” of the Dutch case study) and, in the worst 
case scenario, the development of “silo mentalities” wherein parallel systems 
maintain their own organizational norms, beliefs and practices with little 
communication with each other. Such systems are highly unlikely to communicate the 
need for innovation within themselves and will militate against the successful 
dissemination of innovative ideas and practices. 
Heritage and legacy: Public sector organizations are frequently prone to entrenched 
practices and procedures – that which has worked in the past is seen as good practice 
and there is frequently an attitude of “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it”. The systemic 
impact of innovation and change is often viewed as an unwelcome perturbation to the 
overall functioning of the organization and change and new operational 
methodologies may be discouraged. Similarly, there may also be a tendency to adopt 
the “not invented here” attitude with an unwillingness to accept novel ideas from 
outside the immediate organizational peer group. Again, these factors will militate 
against the inception of innovations and their dissemination. 
‘Professional’ resistance: Public health systems comprise a number of distinct and 
well-established professional groupings, with their own communities of practice, 
rationales, and perspectives. These tend to adhere to their established roles, and 
associated policy agendas. Parts of the public system may operate according to 
differing command and control structures. There may hence be a reticence to embrace 
change and innovation. A lack of dialogue between different parts of the public 
system, horizontally or vertically, between different professional groups may also 
hinder innovation and its dissemination. Thus, different medical professions may be 
unwilling to accept the ideas of others, even if both share similar professional status 
(for example, surgeons and anaesthetists), whilst the problem may be exacerbated 
between members of (perceived) hierarchically separated professional levels (for 
example, gynaecologists and midwives, or doctors and ambulance staff). A further 
barrier concerns problems of non-ownership of ideas and resistance to disseminate 
“good ideas” that may be appropriated by others – similar to the “not invented here” 
phenomenon mentioned above under heritage and legacy. At the technical level, this 
may translate to problems over the ownership of IP. 
Risk aversion: There is an understandable inherent resistance (which is particularly 
strong in the medical professions) to undertake or implement changes which may 
result in an increased probability of risk (to the patients in their care or to the other 
 
20 For example, the UK National Health Service is the largest public sector employer in Europe. 
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recipients of their services). The emphasis placed on the development of evidence-
based medical and clinical practice over recent years is one consequence of the health 
professions’ desire to minimise the unforeseen consequences of new health 
interventions. The definition of innovation implies novelty with its attendant lack of 
pre-knowledge on the possible outcomes. Moreover, innovations are rarely isolated 
phenomena and often depend upon, or engender, further changes and innovation 
leading to a ripple-effect across the entire system in which they are applied.  
Public/political profile and accountability: The health sector has a professional and 
public duty to deliver the highest possible standards of care. As a result, health is a 
major political issue and the shortcomings of government health policies often form 
the focus of political, and hence, media debate. Likewise, examples of medical 
malpractice and maladministration are seized upon by the popular media in its search 
for news material. Consequently, public service managers and politicians are very 
wary of enacting changes that may result in negative outcomes, particularly if there is 
the risk that these will attract media focus. There may also be a tendency towards a 
blame culture, with its associated high levels of accountability. Added to this is the 
risk of patient litigation in the event of adverse impacts and events. These features 
contribute to the broader notion of risk aversion already described above and could 
further hinder the process of innovation. 
Need for consultation, and unclear outcomes: Further allied to the issues of the lack 
of pre-knowledge associated with the introduction of novel medical practices and 
procedures, and that of risk aversion, the large range of stakeholder involvement 
within the health sector generates a strong requirement to consult and review any 
planned changes and modifications and to attempt to identify all the potential 
consequences of such actions. This is exacerbated by the complexity of the health 
system and difficulties with obtaining a clear picture of all the eventual effects of 
these actions. Thus diffusion or roll-out of new innovations forms a major 
management issue. A related problem concerns the systemic nature of innovation, i.e. 
the possibility that the introduction of one innovation may shift the underlying 
problem to another, downstream, part of the system or may have unforeseen and 
adverse consequences. Thus, the introduction of any innovation should require close 
ex ante assessment, coupled with careful review and evaluation. 
  
 
 
Pace and scale of change: Many public administrations, for a variety of political and 
policy reasons (such as the introduction of New Public Management approaches), 
have over recent years been subject to a large number of often radical changes. The 
pace of change has also been dramatic and this has led to an environment of shifting 
targets and the absence of adequate opportunity to reflect upon and assess the 
consequences of many of the innovations introduced. The introduction of new 
political ideologies, new ‘world views’ etc. may also accelerate the pace at which 
policy makers (at all levels) wish to see change implemented. Thus, while political 
will may be viewed as a driver for innovation and change (see below), the systems to 
which it applied may become “innovation-fatigued” and resistant to further change.  
Absence of a capacity for organizational learning (at all levels): There may be a lack 
of structures and mechanisms for the enhancement of organizational learning, 
exacerbated by their scale and complexity and the problems these features generate 
(see above). If there is a lack of dialogue between the actors in a complex system, for 
a variety of reasons such as legacy and professional resistance, how can the diffusion 
of good practice be managed? Frequent reorganizations (see “g. pace and scale of 
change”) will also promote a lack of corporate memory. This problem can operate at 
all levels from the top of the policy-making hierarchy down to the service delivery 
level.  
Obstacles to learning in the public sector 
(Taken from Publin report D15 Policy learning, what does it mean and how can we study it? by 
René Kemp and Rifka Weehuizen) 
There are clear obstacles to learning in the public sector. Although learning is a normal 
human phenomenon there are significant obstacles to learning within the process of 
government and policy making. According to Chapman (2002, p. 13) the most important 
obstacles are: 
• An aversion to failure, exacerbated by the political process which uses failure to 
score points rather than learn lessons 
• The pressure of uniformity in public services. 
• Shared assumptions between civil servants and ministers that command and control 
is the correct way to exercise power. 
• Lack of evaluation of previous policies. 
• Lack of time to do anything other than cope with events. 
• A tradition of secrecy used to stifle feedback and learning. 
• The dominance of turf wars and negotiations between departments, effectively 
making end-user performance secondary to other considerations. 
• The loss of professional integrity and autonomy under the knife of efficiency in 
policy making, and resistance and protection of vested interests by some 
professional and intermediary bodies 
The barriers have to do with mentalities, tradition and with power by obstructing learning 
feedback. Deutsch (1963) famously remarked that those in power can afford not to learn 
(From foreword by Hoppe in Eberg et al., 2002). 
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Public (and end-user) resistance to change: There is an assumed general resistance of 
the public to reorganization and changes in the way healthcare and other public 
services are delivered. Thus, the public, or elements of it, may also be risk averse. 
Various factors may operate here such as age, ethnic background, personal wealth, 
access to ICT, etc. It is assumed that the public forms the typical end-user, although it 
may be represented by various lobby and interest groups. In some cases, perhaps 
where the mode of delivery is changed with no discernible change to the service or 
‘product’ from the public user’s perspective, the end-user may be the service 
deliverer.  
 
The role of public sector entrepreneurs 
(From Publin Report No. D19, Innovation in the health sector – case study analysis, by Paul 
Cunningham) 
Irrespective of the organizational capacity for innovation, one of the most striking 
features common to most of the case studies was the key role played by the presence of 
highly skilled and committed “entrepreneurs” or champions, able to drive forward the 
innovation process. Such people were found to have played key roles both at the 
national and regional level in the case of NHS Direct, in the Salford specialist diabetes 
education team, the introduction of Digital Radiology in the Madrid Hospital and in the 
Swedish SABH process. In a broader context, the presence of a positive staff attitude 
towards new ways of operating was also found to be important in the Spanish case 
study. 
The degree of success of such entrepreneurs and innovations was also found to be 
highly dependent on a number of organizational features. The NHS Direct local systems 
were themselves very open to innovative practices whilst the open remit of the NHS 
Direct sites encouraged problem solving and new, spin-off or complementary, initiatives 
and innovations; many instances were noted of new applications and linkages with 
complementary services. In the Dutch case study it was found that the linkage of care 
programmes with the administrative system promoted the management of the new 
organization, offering improved ownership of patient care problems. There was also 
recognition of the importance of feedback mechanisms for monitoring the (intended and 
unintended) impacts of innovation at a variety of levels. This element of self assessment 
and self introspection was also noted in the Irish case study: the project was preceded by 
a thorough baseline research study and by the use of focus groups; it was introduced on 
a test basis as a pilot (as was NHS Direct in the UK); there was a strong element of 
evaluation (as in several other case studies); and the use of team meetings was seen as a 
positive learning experience. In Sweden, the SABH process was found to heavily rely 
on developing both a teamwork approach and in having staff able to work 
independently. There was also an extensive pre-project planning phase. Lastly, it was 
noted that in the Salford diabetes education project, a high degree of organizational 
learning had been exhibited by the relevant Primary Care Trusts. 
While the above indicates that mechanisms such as appraisal, dialogue and evaluation 
are all key components for organizational learning, a willingness to experiment and try 
new approaches was also seen to be a useful attribute towards the success of the 
innovations studied. 
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Absence of resources: This feature has been clearly identified within the general 
factors affecting public health systems, particularly those associated with 
demographic changes and disease conditions. Not only does it include a lack of 
financial support, either in a general context or specifically for the support of 
innovation, it can also include shortages in relevant skills or other support services 
required for the implementation of innovations. As noted above, the systemic nature 
of the impacts of innovation, whilst relieving pressure on one part of the system may 
result in a shift of the problem or bottleneck to another part of the system. Moreover, 
the general desire to improve the quality of health provision often entails the need to 
expend additional resources – not all health innovation is aimed at economic 
efficiencies.  
Technical barriers: Whilst the development of a new technology or technological 
application may serve as a strong driver or facilitator of process or organizational 
change, the absence of a technology which exhibits certain specifications may also 
hinder the development of a sought-for innovation. Thus, the application of new uses 
to existing equipment, for example, may push the technology to the limits of its 
capabilities and act as a driver for  further technical innovation. 
Drivers and facilitators 
A number of counters to the barriers noted above may also be discerned. These may 
be categorised as drivers for (i.e. pressures for innovation) and facilitators (i.e. factors 
which aid the uptake and dissemination of innovation) in the public health system. 
Again, these may operate either at the national level, in the broad environment of the 
innovation or may be specifically linked to the innovation itself. 
Problem-oriented drivers: It is clear that many innovations in the public health sector 
are introduced in response to one or more specific problems. Typical underlying 
causes, as noted above, include demographic factors, ageing population, 
fragmentation of families, life-style health and social problems, etc. Thus, an 
innovation may be required to deal with new specific problems (i.e. the rapid increase 
in child obesity), or with generic problems (such as the need to reduce in-patient 
resident times as a means to free up hospital beds), or to speed up the processing of 
health care administrative tasks. 
Non-problem oriented improvement: Innovations may also be introduced because, 
rather than dealing with a specific problem, they represent an improvement on the 
former situation. For example, doing things faster or more efficiently is generally a 
broad goal but does not necessarily represent a specific problem in itself. Similarly, a 
new medical technique may confer improved quality of life for patients but may not 
offer any further advantages.. 
Political push: Strategic change in the public sector frequently requires a strong, top-
down, political will coupled with the political recognition that change requires the 
allocation of substantial resources. This may be ideologically based or in response to 
critical events and pressures. It may also include the adoption of new world views and 
concepts – thus, in several countries successive political ideologies have sought to 
find free-market solutions mainly to ameliorate the enormous financial burden 
imposed by a “free” (at point of delivery) public service and also, indirectly, to 
provide incentives for improved service delivery. At the delivery level, political goals 
may be reflected through the imposition of performance targets (which may facilitate 
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innovation although with the danger that, as with most indicators, they can distort the 
behavior of actors within the system in unanticipated and possibly undesirable ways) 
– see Competitive drivers, below. 
Growth of a culture of review: A range of assessment practices have developed over 
the years in the public sector (especially in the health system), ranging from evidence 
based guidance, health technology assessment, and clinical audit through to broader 
scale review activities. The development of these techniques could, at least in theory, 
alleviate the problems associated both with assessing the potential impacts of 
innovations and with promoting a culture of organizational learning, hence this 
feature may represent both a barrier to and a facilitator of innovation. 
Support mechanisms for innovation: This can represent the allocation of appropriate 
resources (finance and other forms of support) to promote innovation and its 
implementation. Allied to the allocation of resources is the provision of actual 
structures and systems designed to promote, stimulate or disseminate innovation (e.g. 
staff suggestion boxes, staff fora, stakeholder feedback mechanisms, networking 
activities, competence building, encouragement of alternative thinking, etc.). These 
may operate either from the top-down or from the bottom-up. Both mechanisms may 
also monitor external sources, such as practice in other public service systems either 
domestically or abroad for transferable examples of innovations.  
Capacity for innovation: Staff in the public health system are often characterised by 
their high levels of professional expertise, exhibiting a high level for creativity and 
problem solving, thus providing an environment in which innovation should both be 
generated and accepted. This is frequently demonstrated by the presence of 
entrepreneurs or “innovation champions” who drive forward the process of innovation 
and its implementation and diffusion. Moreover, medical and health professionals are 
generally driven by a strong desire to improve the well-being and quality of life of the 
patients in their care, which may further prompt the search for new solutions and 
approaches. 
Competitive drivers: The use of performance targets to derive “league tables” (for 
example, of hospitals, schools and universities, in the UK) can encourage the use of 
innovative approaches in order to force up performance ratings. However, the use of 
such targets, indicators and league tables often distorts operational behaviors, 
sometimes with unintended and deleterious consequences (such as the refusal of GPs 
to operate accessible appointments systems in order to drive down waiting lists). 
Therefore, this is one example of a driver which may force innovation to operate in 
non-optimal ways. 
Technological factors: It is clear that technological innovation can be a strong 
determinant or driver for subsequent innovation. The introduction or availability of 
new technology (for example, telemedicine or advanced data storage and handling 
capabilities, etc.) may provide an opportunity for another form of innovation (process, 
organizational, delivery, system interaction, etc.) to take place or to be implemented.  
In the final summary report of Publin, these barriers and drivers will be used as the 
basis for policy recommendations. 
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 The role of crisis and reframing in learning and innovation 
In the Dutch case study, the management of a psychiatric hospital decided to implement a 
major innovation: the implementation of so-called care programmes (“zorgprogramma’s”). 
This is a patient-centered, process-oriented, evidence-based approach, which involves major
changes in the care chain. A newly hired experienced manager from outside of the health 
care sector was willing to take up the task to prepare an innovation plan for and with the 
organization; he was the innovation “entrepreneur” in the process. There was considerable 
resistance to change, especially from the side of the psychiatrists, who up until then were 
king in their own kingdom and did not feel like giving away power to professional 
managers. At some point the innovation process was slowing down, it was very hard to get 
from the conceptual phase to the phase of actual implementation.  
Then a crisis hit the organization: there were serious financial problems due to 
mismanagement of the director. The director had to resign and the “entrepreneur” of the 
innovation process was appointed as the new director. The crisis made the personnel 
including the psychiatrist see that they needed to change in order to survive as an 
organization and this facilitated the implementation of the innovation. It changed their 
perspective dramatically. Instead of seeing the innovation as an unwanted change involving 
more effort of the personnel and representing a threat to the positions of the psychiatrists, it 
now was seen as a solution that could save the organization and the people working in it.  
A crucial element was to gain the trust and confidence of the employees in the time of 
crisis. The “innovation entrepreneur” recognized the crisis as a “window of opportunity” to 
get acceptance and support of structural organizational changes. It involved substantial 
management skills to take away the distrust; many employees in the health care sector are 
cynical, seeing innovation as a hidden attempt to simply cut costs. An acute crisis however 
changed the view of “we” (the employees) against “them” (the management) into a “we” 
(the organization as a whole, together) against “them”(the financing institutions of health 
care). The new director made sure that the organization did not perceive him as an agent of 
“them”. The reframing was important for increasing the willingness to change. The wider 
institutional structure was conducive to innovation because the main financial agency 
involved offered an arrangement to deal with the financial difficulties on condition of a plan 
of how things would be done differently and better. Because of all this the innovation still 
goes ahead. he empirical studies of Publin 
he various aspects of an analytical framework for a theory of innovation for public 
ctivities and sectors outlined in this paper, has found confirmation or otherwise 
irrored in the conclusions of the empirical work having been undertaken in Publin. 
e give a brief synopsis below of the two strands of empirical work. The first section 
s based on the survey and interviews performed in the WP 3 of Publin – see Publin 
eport D17. Secondly we consider the national case studies. For an overall synthesis 
f these see Publin Report D18 and D19, cf. also the eleven detailed case study 
eports, Publin Reports D12-1 – D13-5. 
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The Publin Surveys 
Work Package 3 of the Publin project, i.e. the surveys and the common questions 
included in most case study interviews, was to reach a better understanding of patterns 
of innovation that are underused today, and that may be used to encourage greater 
collaboration between the government and its operative-administrative branches, its 
citizens, and the business and private sectors.  
Publin distributed two questionnaires, one to managers and employees in public sector 
organizations and one to so-called “end users”. The “end users” were represented by 
members of organizations representing the interests of end users vis-à-vis public 
authorities (mostly NGOs), as it was felt that these persons would have a better 
knowledge of how public organizations are functioning. 
In the Publin survey report (Report D17, Report on the Publin surveys) Eran Vigoda-
Gadot, Aviv Shoham, Ayalla Ruvio and Nitza Schwabsky point out that organizations 
in which innovativeness  is valued are more likely to implement or adopt innovations. 
Based on the extant literature, they identify five components of innovativeness that 
have been incorporated into the theoretical model. This model also included 
antecedents of innovativeness and expected outcomes of organizational 
innovativeness. 
Lumpkin and Dess defined innovativeness as reflecting “the firm’s tendency to 
engage in and support new ideas, novelty experimentation and creative processes that 
may result in new products, services, or technological processes”. As such, 
innovativeness is not tied to specific product innovations; rather, it reflects an 
organizational trait and the willingness to pursue new opportunities. Hurley and Hult 
(1998) distinguish between innovativeness and the capacity to innovate. In their 
conceptualization, innovativeness is part of an organization’s culture, whereas 
innovative capacity is an organizational outcome. 
The theoretical model underlying the Publin survey research project includes the 
following antecedents of innovativeness:  
 
• Market Orientation (including Information Generation, Information 
Dissemination, and Responsiveness) 
• Team Spirit 
• Internal Politics 
• Connectedness 
• Centralization 
These constructs were expected to impact Organization Innovativeness, 
conceptualized as a five-component construct that includes Openness, Risk Taking, 
Future Orientation, Creativity, and Pro-activeness.  
The Publin researchers distinguished between two types of outcomes of 
innovativeness – an individual level of outcomes and an organizational level of 
outcomes. At the individual, behavioural level, Organization Innovativeness was 
expected to have an impact on Commitment and Work Satisfaction.  
At the organizational level, they expected Innovativeness to have an impact on 
Innovation Performance (benchmarked against Plans, Leaders’ Expectations, and 
Users’ Expectations), Organizational Performance (benchmarked against Plans, 
Leaders’ Expectations, and Users’ Expectations), and Organizational Learning (a six-
dimensional concept).  
 
 
In reviewing the results of this facet of Publin, the researchers were mindful that they 
examined pairs of related constructs in isolation. They expected the set of antecedents 
to have a strong overall impact on innovativeness and its sub-dimensions. Similarly, 
the set of innovativeness sub-dimensions was expected to have a strong impact on the 
various outcomes studied. 
The data from the manager’s survey (i.e. responses to the questionnaire distributed 
among public sector employees) provided strong support for the theoretical model, 
Data Collection  
A mixed methodology, quantitative and qualitative, was developed to examine innovation in 
the public sector. Following a pilot study of public practitioners and end users for each of the 
research methods, surveys were collected as follows: A minimum of 100 managers and 
frontline employees of health and social service organizations, and a minimum of 50 end-
users of non-profit organizations were surveyed in each of the nine countries that participated 
in the study.  
Interviews 
Additionally, about 15 in-depth interviews with public sector managers and frontline 
employees were conducted in each of the participating counties for a total of 163 in-depth 
interviews. The in-depth interviews focused on definitions and examples of innovation, 
entrepreneurship, drivers and barriers, networking and learning, politics, performance and the 
evaluation of innovation.  
Manager/Employee Survey 
Participants of the Manager/ frontline employee survey consisted of close to 70% female 
employees (69.4%). A little less than a half of the participants are of public Health 
organizations (42.1%), and a little over a half are of the Social Services (57.9%). Regarding 
their organizational positions, of the entire group of participants, about a third are managers 
(33.1%), and close to a half are frontline employees (45.2%), and about 20% of the 
participants classified themselves as "other", meaning, that they hold positions other than 
"managers" or "frontline employees". The participants' age mean score is 41.68 (SD = 11.04), 
and their education mean score is 14.74 (SD = 6.32).  
End-User Survey 
The end-users survey was distributed to end-user representatives, in particular representatives 
of relevant NGOs and member of public sector boards. The reason for this was partly practical 
(there were not enough resources to carry out a full scale public survey) and partly 
methodological (traditional end-users, like patients, do not normally have knowledge of the 
internal innovation practices of public institutions). Of the entire group of End-User survey 
participants, close to 65% are female employees (64.3%). A little over a third of the 
participants are of the Third sector, and close to two thirds are of the Public Sector (60.9%).  
Participants' age mean score is 45.48 (SD =16.96), and their education mean score is 15.64 
(SD =3.94). Participants' average income is divided almost evenly, with about a third of the 
participants (32.6%) earning below average, a little over a third (39.2%) earning an average 
income, and close to 30% (28.2%) earning an above average income.   
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both when assessed at the combined (multi-sample) level, as well as when assessed 
for each country separately (with a few minor exceptions and differences).  
Specifically, most of the antecedents of innovativeness, in isolation, had correlations 
with the five components of innovativeness varying between 0.40 and 0.50.  In other 
words, the impact of each, considered on its own, explains 15-25% of the variance in 
the relevant components of innovativeness. Therefore, even assuming some 
conceptual and empirical overlap among these antecedents, a much higher proportion 
of the variance in the components of innovativeness should be explained by the full 
set in combination.  
Similarly, the five dimensions of innovativeness affected all outcome variables. While 
a few had a weak correlation with some outcomes (most notably for Organizational 
Learning), the general pattern was encouraging. Innovativeness was correlated with 
the outcomes mostly at a level of 0.35-0.60. Thus, even in isolation, innovativeness’ 
components provide an explanation for 10-35% of the variance in these outcomes 
(except for Organizational Learning). Here, too, even if the five innovativeness 
components overlap empirically to some extent, a much higher portion of the variance 
in outcomes should be explainable by these components.  
The end-users model was developed to explain public sector performance using a 
series of attitudinal and perceptional variables representing users’ views of public 
sector innovation. The researchers expected the perception of the public sector as 
innovative to lead to higher levels of trust in public sector organizations and increased 
satisfaction from such organizations among citizens. Satisfaction from public 
institutions, a positive image of public service organizations, and trust in them are all 
vital in a democratic society (Chanley, Rudolph & Rahn, 2000).   
The model for end-users was originally developed to parallel the one for managers 
and frontline employees. However, the researchers made two major changes before 
the commencement of data collection. First, they replaced some constructs and 
changed a number of others (generally by reducing the number of items used to 
operationalise them) to fit the specific context of this second survey. Secondly, data 
was collected from managers in third-sector organizations that advocate and promote 
citizens’ interests, rather than from citizens themselves as originally planned. The 
surveying of such managers is advantageous in that they know more about the 
phenomena studied, making them more accurate sources of information. Its major 
disadvantage is that the participants answered as managers, making them less 
representative than the population-at-large as sources of data. 
Antecedents to perceived innovativeness of the public sector included Connectedness, 
Employees’ Professionalism, Ethics and Morality, Internal Politics, Promoters of 
Innovation, Public Sector Leadership/Vision, and Responsiveness. A key point to note 
is that the data in this area reflected the perceptions of the participants. A two-
dimensional approach was used to measure innovativeness (Innovation and 
Innovativeness). The three outcomes (referred to as consequences in the results) were 
Image, Satisfaction with Provided Services, and Trust in Institutions.  
Findings indicated that end-users do not consider the public sector highly innovative – 
the mean innovativeness score for the entire sample was 2.8 out of 5. Relationships 
within this second study (end-users) were for the most part weaker than for the first 
study (managerial/frontline employees). It should be noted, however, that this was not 
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true for all the variables and that in some of the countries, moderate to strong 
relationships were found in certain cases. Still, while explained variance should 
improve with the inclusion of multiple predictors, we expect the full set of 
antecedents to explain much less of the variance in innovativeness than the set for the 
managerial/frontline employees’ survey did.  
The strongest predictor of innovativeness, Connectedness, had a correlation of 0.35 
with it. In isolation, therefore, this strongest predictor explained only about 12% of 
the variance. The other antecedents that had some sort of association were Leadership 
and Responsiveness. These latter two reflect the public sector’s ability to understand 
and address the public’s needs in a quick and efficient manner. Public organizations 
that accomplish this goal are viewed as open to changes and new technologies, and 
are thus seen as innovative. Meanwhile, Internal Politics, which is normally 
considered a hindering factor for public sector innovation (Borins, 2000; 2001), was 
not perceived as such by the end-users in our study. 
As was the case with its relationships with the antecedent variables, innovativeness, 
however it was measured, was a fairly weak predictor of the outcomes studied. The 
highest correlation was for Innovativeness and Satisfaction with Services, which 
reached 0.33. Accordingly, Innovativeness, in isolation, accounts for about 11% of the 
variance in Satisfaction. Here, too, improvements should result from the inclusion of a 
fuller set of predictors, but the set of outcomes would be explainable by 
Innovativeness to a lesser degree than in the first survey. 
We note several reasons for the weaker results of the second study. First, some of the 
constructs in the first survey were excluded from the second. Second, for variables 
included in both surveys, there were fewer items in the second, increasing potential 
measurement errors. Third, whereas managers/frontline employees should be 
knowledgeable about their organizations, managers in third-sector organizations 
should not be as knowledgeable, again increasing measurement errors. 
In sum, we believe that the model was generally supported by the data in both studies. 
This conclusion holds at the complete sample level as well as for each country 
separately (although, not surprising, there are minor differences across countries).  
According to the survey report, there are numerous practical implications arising from 
the two studies. First and foremost, given its positive and strong impact on 
Organizational and Innovativeness Performance, public sector organizations should 
encourage and build organization-level Innovativeness. In this respect, although all 
components of Innovativeness contributed to Performance and should be emphasized 
to some extent, some components of innovativeness are more crucial than others and 
deserve special attention from top management. However, given limited resources, of 
the five, Creativity should be singled out, as it had the strongest impact on measures 
of Performance. In contrast, Risk-Taking can be de-emphasized, as it had the weakest 
impact on Performance.  
Since Innovativeness contributed to Performance, how can we encourage it in public 
sector organizations? Both Internal Politics and, to a lesser extent, Centralization 
reduced organizational innovativeness. Thus, both should be managed to reduce their 
pervasiveness in organizations seeking to increase their Innovativeness. Market 
Orientation (Information Generation, Information Dissemination, and 
Responsiveness), Team Spirit, and Connectedness all contributed to Organizational 
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Innovativeness. Consequently, public sector organizations should consider ways to 
enhance these antecedents.  
The Publin survey findings are based on research in the public sector (first-sector 
organizations) and our recommendations therefore refer to these types of 
organizations. However, we believe that our theoretical model and findings may be 
applicable for other non-profit organizations (third-sector). This could be an 
interesting avenue to explore in future research. 
The Qualitative Study 
The national Publin teams were asked to include some selected questions when 
interviewing policy makers and public employees for their case studies. The responses 
were used for a transnational mapping of attitudes and practices. 
Analysis of the international managers' and front-line in-depth interviews shows that 
innovation is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the public sector. Even if some of the 
interviewees were not familiar with the term "innovation", they used synonymous 
words to describe innovation, and there was no question about the need for 
innovation, and its existence in the public sector. Innovation reflects newness and 
change, and is closely allied with organizational and policy learning. 
According to our respondents managers are the primary initiators of innovation, 
followed by employees, other organizational personnel and professionals, government 
and politicians, end-users and external organizations. While the majority of 
innovations in the public sector are top-down and policy-driven, findings show that 
interviewees generally see the organization's management or political parties rather 
than external organizations or the EU as the initiators of new approaches.   
In their role as innovators, managers and department heads are believed to be the ones 
who create, plan, and promote the innovation. Employees are viewed as the ones who 
provide the service: they bring ideas, argue, report problems, and implement the 
innovation. The end-users respond to the changes, give feedback and complain. 
Innovation would not occur without facilitating and hindering forces. Facilitators of 
innovation are predominantly internal, organizational forces that include the 
leadership and management, cultures open to change, supportive personnel and proper 
funding. External facilitators include the EU, the legislature, or national initiatives, as 
well as information, learning, and networking. 
Obstacles to innovation are predominantly internal to the organization as well. 
Findings show that interviewees perceive barriers to innovation as deriving from 
public service’s leadership and management (i.e., budget cuts or poor allocation of 
budget funds, and poor leadership). Additional obstacles are the traditional regulations 
and work routines, employee resistance, internal and external politics, poor learning 
environment, and end users' resistance.  
Organizational learning and policy learning emerge as an integral part of innovation, 
and are reflected through the infrastructures that facilitate organizational learning, 
networking and cooperation with other organizations, and the development of 
competencies and networking. Internal and external organizational networking 
emerged as important for the success of innovations.  
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There was broad agreement as to the importance of the measurement criteria of 
innovation success. These range from routine measures to a lack of overall criteria. 
Quantitative scientific measures and qualitative measures are used to evaluate 
innovation. Quantitative measures often consist of observed criteria such as number of 
people served, duration of hospitalization, medical malpractice, percentage of clients 
who are referred or complete the service, etc. Qualitative measures consist of 
measures such as general notions of client satisfaction and the reasons for it, 
managers' evaluations, and performance progress. Some of the measures, however, 
rely on “gut feelings” rather than on scientific methods. Interviewees seemed 
uncomfortable with this question, and some interviewees reported being unaware of 
any clear method for measuring innovation. Difficulties with measurement criteria 
include information that is not linked to primary processes of innovation, scarcity of 
measurement tools, lack of time or resources, or difficulty in accessing clients' or 
other sensitive data. The importance that interviewees placed on innovation combined 
with the lack of clear measures suggests that this area needs some attention. 
Expected and unexpected implications followed. Expected and intended implications, 
positive or negative, emerged in relation to the improvement of service provision and 
performance, management and administration, professionalism and work conditions. 
Examples of intended implications include safety, economic changes and aspects of 
innovation flexibility. Unintended implications and consequences of innovation, both 
positive and negative, emerged in the areas of service provision, performance 
reputation, administration, networking and support. Additional unintended 
consequences were heavier workloads (i.e. paperwork), end-users' and employees' 
resistance to innovation, competition from interest groups, and innovation serving as 
an impetus to further additional innovations. Some implications are both positive and 
negative simultaneously, when directed at different goals or players. 
The primary beneficiaries of innovation according to the interviewees are the end-
users ("clients"); however, practitioners and employees also benefit from innovation.  
In sum, findings show that innovation is ubiquitous in the public sector. It is aimed at 
improving the provision of service, involves a variety of stakeholders, is linked to 
organizational learning, and benefits end users, practitioners and managers. While 
there are indications of successful innovations, not much is known about unsuccessful 
innovations, their characteristics, or why they fail. Managers should be attentive to 
obstacles that hinder innovation and negative consequences as much as to positive 
consequences of innovations and success stories.  
Recommendations to innovators reflect the interviewees’ major comments in 
descending order - from the most frequent, to the least, as follows:  
1. Develop quality leadership that creates the right climate for change (Swed), 
"walk the talk" (Neth) and institute "cultural change" (UK, Slov, Isr, Norway). 
2. Involve employees and get their support and commitment (Swed, Ireland, 
Neth, UK), encourage personnel to take initiative (Swed), make people feel 
'it’s their project' (Neth), provide feedback (Ire), 'buy in' a full range of 
stakeholders for commitment (Ire) and cultural change (UK). 
3. Develop inter and intra- organizational networking, coordination and 
cooperation at all levels (Lith, Norway, Spain, Israel), 
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4. Plan ahead, assess the situation and evaluate (Lith, Israel, UK) while 
remembering the goal of improving the provision of services (Lith, Neth); 
"Innovation must be based on evidence… (a) "studying future demands",  and 
(b) "developing creative service/delivery solutions could yield substantial 
savings in the mid to longer-term." [UK] 
5. Be open and creative, think "outside of the box", listen to new people, use 
research, admit mistakes, and take risks (Ire, Lith, Isr, UK). 
Managers must take all aspects and consequences of innovation into consideration 
when they plan an innovation, and never "rest on their laurels". 
Lessons from the case studies 
In Publin Report No. D18 Innovation in the social sector – case study analysis and 
and report No. D19 Innovation in the health sector – case study analysis, Paul 
Cunningham Ludmila Malikova and Katarina Staroňová identify a a number of 
factors, or shared characteristics from the social sector case studies, that, at least 
partially, may contribute to the initiation, development and implementation of 
innovations in the social service sector. It should be stressed that while all the 
evaluations studied were successful the pathway to implementation was not always 
smooth. Thus, the following lessons are not a recipe for successful innovation but 
only indicators of potential contributory factors. They may also be interpreted as a set 
of broad policy recommendations. 
 
1. Pluralism in different approaches to improving service provision to the client 
groups is important and should be encouraged. As seen in the case studies 
from Norway, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Israel the pluralism in terms of many 
different service providing organizations (NGOs, stakeholders’ associations, 
etc.) has generated many different models and “experiments” for service 
provision. Similarly, autonomy left to the municipalities and service providing 
organizations for the implementation of the national Action Plan (Norway, 
Slovakia) or fulfilment of the national goals leads to innovative environment. 
Although this is not a result of design, the situation is beneficial in terms of 
public debates and political awareness – and ultimately, for policy learning 
 
2. There was a marked tendency for innovating organizations or for key 
personnel to demonstrate openness to ideas and a willingness to think ‘outside 
of the box’. This was found to be equally important in the development of 
novel solutions to problems, or in the identification of solutions to previously 
unrecognised problems or issues. It was also an important factor in the 
acceptance of new ideas and new operational practices, both from the 
perspective of management and from the perspective of those expected to 
deliver or utilise the innovation. 
 
3. In some cases it was clear that it was important to seize opportunities in order 
to implement change and to gain the acceptance of new ideas. Such 
opportunities could relate to the availability of resources, the need to respond 
to enforced change or new circumstances, and the timing of political or 
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organizational events. The coalescence of two or more factors might also be 
seen as an opportunity, such as in the Irish home help innovation where the 
availability of funding and a new agreement on working practices assisted in 
the development of the new process. 
 
4. The role of “champions” or entrepreneurs was clearly significant. The 
presence of individuals with sufficient vision and determination to push the 
innovation process was a characteristic shared by all of the case studies. 
Entrepreneurs are important in development of innovations in public services. 
Although entrepreneurs always are emerging, in the public domain (such as 
service provision and care for the elderly) the challenge is to leverage their 
creativity and channel their energy into activities that give them a sense of 
meaning. If possible, policy should be able to recognize these persons and 
bestow them with resources – and responsibilities.  
 
5. As noted above, champions were important, but also required support. Many 
of the innovations relied, at one level or another on positive attitudes towards 
teamwork and independent thinking in order to take forward the innovation 
concept through a process of development to fruition. In some cases, 
innovations required an entirely new approach, thus the supporting team also 
had to be fully committed to the idea and able to deliver it in what were often 
novel, rapidly changing circumstances. It is also beneficial to co-opt staff 
members and create “agents of change” to overcome potential resistance from 
the (professional) staff. 
  
6. NGOs and the civil society they represent are very important for a number of 
reasons: Being agile and flexible, they seem to have a type of creativity and 
climate for entrepreneurship which is not possible in public organizations. 
Although one may possibly claim that these are not representative, they 
nevertheless represent interests that are committed to public causes. In this, 
they have networks to dedicated people and local chapters which represent 
potentially powerful resources of human capital and creativity. Also, NGOs 
(as proved in transition countries) may have access to additional financial 
resources and in this way be crucial in the research, evaluation or piloting of 
the innovation. In Norway, some of the private charitable funds (old family 
fortunes) function as “venture capital” for development projects in NGOs. 
This model – venture capital logic - is very interesting and public money 
should be used in a similar manner. In a policy perspective, the significance of 
civil society should be recognized and given opportunities for development. 
 
7. The engagement of stakeholders and extensive and ongoing consultative and 
participatory process were key factors in initiating, sustaining and 
implementing innovations. In many cases, a range of stakeholders had to be 
convinced of the utility of the proposed innovations and resistance (to change 
procedures, to provide resources, to engage in practices with a higher 
perceived risk, etc.) had to be overcome. Once innovations had been put in 
place, it was essential to ensure all stakeholders still shared the same vision, 
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that expectations were being met and that the lessons learned were being 
disseminated quickly (see below). 
 
8. Innovating organizations need a high degree of reflexivity – essential an ability 
to demonstrate organizational learning. In concrete terms this behaviour was 
evidenced through practices such as ex ante appraisal, assessment and ongoing 
monitoring processes and evaluation of the outcomes and impacts, often 
within very short timeframes. In some cases these processes were carried out 
directly by the ‘project team’ itself whilst in others they were a feature of the 
broader innovation environment. Reflection and appraisal could occur at all 
levels. Coupled with such reflexivity, a high degree of responsiveness – an 
ability to react quickly to the outcomes of the review process – is also 
important: there is little point in monitoring if it does not prompt reaction. 
 
9. Linked to the above point it seems, from some of the case study evidence, that 
the demonstration of the utility of implemented innovations is an important 
factor in terms of developing further support either for the innovation itself or 
for the implementing team or organization. In cases where the innovation was 
problem-oriented, this is less critical as the success becomes self evident.  
 
10. Again linked to the previous two points is the need to generate recognition 
and support for innovation, both for the innovating organization itself but also 
more widely across the social services system. This was the remit of the 
Norwegian case study where the challenge was to construct arenas or 
institutions for sharing knowledge and learning, e.g. some mechanism for 
demonstrating “best practice” (or “worst practice”). These should be action 
oriented, i.e. demonstrate to actors what kind of measures, approaches or 
techniques that are efficient, etc. A number of the case studies mention the 
need to provide incentives for innovation, particularly in terms of persuading 
various stakeholders to adopt new practices.   
 
11. The retention of momentum is another important factor. Of particular 
relevance is the need for organizations and systems to exhibit flexibility and 
work actively on the identification of further opportunities which may assist 
their particular innovations or which may benefit from it. To some extent, 
these features are linked to a culture of organizational learning and exploit the 
complex nature of innovation.  
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Publin reports 
The following reports have been finalized (hyperlinks included in PDF-file. See also 
www.step.no/publin/reports.html):  
D9 On the differences between public and private sector innovation 
By Thomas Halvorsen, Johan Hauknes, Ian Miles and Rannveig Røste 
D14 The structure and size of the public sector in an enlarged Europe 
By Andrés Maroto and Luis Rubalcaba  
D15 Policy learning, what does it mean and how can we study it? 
By René Kemp and Rifka Weehuizen  
D16 Studies of innovation in the public sector, a theoretical framework 
By Rannveig Røste  
D17 Report on the Publin surveys 
By Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Aviv Shoham, Ayalla Ruvio, Nitza Schwabsky  
D18 Innovation in the social sector – case study analysis 
By Ludmila Malikova and Katarina Staroòová  
D19 Innovation in the health sector – case study analysis 
By Paul Cunningham  
National case studies 
D12-1 Sweden: Hospital-Managed Advanced Care of Children in their Homes 
By Lennart Norgren and Kristina Larsen  
D12-2 UK: Developing Patient-Oriented Education Systems for Diabetes 
By By Paul Windrum and Pascale de Berranger  
D12-3 UK: NHS Direct, An Innovation in Social Trust 
By Paul Cunningham, Lawrence Green, Ian Ian Miles and John Rigby  
D12-4 Spain: The Adoption of Technological and Organizational Innovations in a 
Traditional Public Hospital in Spain 
By Manuel García Goñi  
D12-5 The Netherlands: Process Innovation in Mental Health Care 
By Friso den Hertog, Rifka Weehuizen and Maarten Verkerk  
D12-6 Ireland: Innovation in the provision of home help services in the Southern 
Health Board area 
By Joan Buckley and Carol Linehan  
D13-1 Slovakia: Residential Care for Elderly in Slovakia  
By Katarina Staronová and Ludmila Malíková  
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D13-2 Ireland: Pensions Retirement Savings Accounts  
By Dr. Mairéad Considine  
D13-3 Israel: Regional Resource Centres of Special Education 
By Nitza Schwabsky, Eran Vigoda-Gadot, Aviv Shoham and Ayalla Ruvio  
D13-4 Lithuania: Innovation in Services for the Elderly 
By Rita Bandzeviciene, Aiste Dirzyte, Vidminas Dauderys  
D13-5 Norway: Innovation in home based services for the elderly 
By Helge Godø, Rannveig Røste and Marianne Broch  
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